

A people power philosophy: Republicanism in opposition in Tanzania

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This article is about democratic political thought and African political parties. Studies judges that opposition speak about democracies, but rarely express democratic ideologies. This determination arises from democracy's perceived hegemony. As democracy is accepted, opposition parties invoke democracy without arguing for it, rehearsing democratic ideas without advocating them. I contest this line of argument. There is a multiplicity of democratic ideologies. Therefore, whether or not democracy is hegemonic, not all arguments for it are. By omission, the Africanist politics literature has denied this variety in democratic thought and precluded the study of one variant of it in particular: republicanism. Republicanisms elevate domination and corruption as ills and advocate limiting state power and empowering citizens. I analyse the "people's power philosophy" of leading Tanzanian opposition party, Chadema. It imagines a ruling party oligarchy which pursues its private interests through an interconnected system of domination and corruption. To end domination and check corruption, Chadema advocates institutional reforms which limit state power, and extra-institutional measures to empower citizens. It claims that it must overpower the oligarchy in a popular struggle. It imagines struggle as the breaking of everyday dominance and therefore as emancipatory. I argue that this philosophy constitutes a republican democratic ideology.

Keywords: republicanism; democratic theory; democratization; political parties; African politics

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Democracy, the adage goes, needs democrats. Yet studies conclude ruefully that few can be found among African opposition politicians. Specifically, they determine that African opposition parties often speak about democracy, but rarely express democratic ideologies.¹ On the contrary, haunted by “change-candidates” that disappointed, they often dismiss opposition messages about democracy as opportunistic or ideologically vacant. They depreciate the ideational content of African democratic ideas on the grounds – among other - that democratic principles are widely accepted; democracy is hegemonic. Accordingly, opposition parties take the desirability of democracy as given. They make valence appeals which assert their superior competence to fulfil those ideas, without asserting those ideals themselves.²

I write in revision of this literature. There are many conceptions of democracy, and many arguments through which it might be justified. In light of this variety in democratic thought, the depreciation of the ideological content of African opposition messages should be rethought. Whether or not the ideals of democracy are widely accepted, not all visions of or arguments for it are. Therefore, speaking of democracy still means choosing which vision of it to assert and arguments of it to make. However, the Africanist literature has seldom recognized this variety in contemporary democratic thought. This has precluded the study of how political parties in general and opposition parties in particular articulate democratic ideologies in spite of any hegemony of democracy.

I argue that this denial of the diversity of democratic thought has not only precluded the study of potential variant-strand in democratic thought, but one concrete strand in particular: republicanism. By “republicanism,” I do not mean the political thought of the US Republican Party. Instead, I refer to the intellectual tradition which can trace its lineage back through James Madison, James Harrington, Montesquieu, and

Niccolò Machiavelli to Cicero, Polybius and Aristotle, among others.³ Republicanisms vary, but most elevate domination and corruption as ills, and freedom as non-domination and government in the common interest as ideals.⁴ They advocate mixed government, the limitation and division of arbitrary state power, and the empowerment of citizens. Contemporary republicanisms are democratic republicanisms; some simultaneously embrace democratic ideals; most embrace democratic constitutions, albeit reformed, as the means to realize republican goals.

I study the case of Chadema (*Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo*, or “the Party of Democracy and Development”). Chadema was Tanzania’s leading opposition party between 2006 and 2020, when it was electorally eliminated in an apparently manipulated election amid an authoritarian turn.⁵ I analyse Chadema’s political message in a period of significant discursive continuity between 2006 and 2015. Past analyses of Chadema’s message closely mirror the analyses of opposition parties at large. They conclude that Chadema focused on democratic issues, but they dismiss the possibility that these ideas constituted a democratic ideology. However, Chadema espouses what it calls a people’s power philosophy. I argue that this philosophy closely resembles a republican democratic ideology.

Chadema construed Tanzania as ridden by corruption. It imagined this corruption as perpetrated by an oligarchy at the pinnacle of the ruling party. It claimed that this oligarchy dominated the state, and through it, the people. It portrayed domination and corruption a mutually reinforcing system. Chadema called for that system to be dismantled. It championed constitutional reforms that would check and balance arbitrary state power. These neo-republican reforms would prevent domination and stymie corruption. However, it claimed that to achieve these reforms, first the ruling party must be overthrown. It argued that this could only be achieved by citizens

resisting domination through direct action. Chadema presented itself as the collective organ through which citizens could break the domination of the ruling party. It claimed that this would constitute a “second liberation.” Therefore, Chadema’s people power philosophy connected empowerment and emancipation in radical republican terms.

In sum, Chadema’s message expresses a contentious ideology about and in advocacy of democracy. Irrespective of whether democracy was widely accepted, Chadema articulated a distinct conception of what it constitutes and a distinct argument in its favour. Therefore, there is not just potential, but manifest, diversity in democratic thought in contemporary African party politics.

While some political theorists from Africa advocate radical republicanism,⁶ to my knowledge, this is the first study is the first to argue that a contemporary African political party has articulated a republicanism. However, it is unlikely that Chadema is its lone proponent on the continent. On the contrary, I suggest that contemporary opposition parties in other post-liberation regimes, and express ideologies which resemble republicanism. Third-wave democratization movements may have too. I hope that by revealing the close resemblance between Chadema’s ideology and democratic republicanism, I will inspire future research to explore republican democratic thought elsewhere in Africa and beyond.

More broadly, in this article I join others in exploring that hitherto neglected diversity in popular democratic thought in contemporary Africa.⁷ In harmony with them, I illustrate the variety in contemporary democratic thought in Africa. In chorus with them, I call for future research to explore this abundance of intellectual ideas in both the present and the past.

Documentary evidence of Chadema’s political thought is scarce. For this project, I collected a set of Chadema documents, including its 2006 constitution, its

2010 and 2015 manifestos, a handbook on its ideology published in 2014. Although they fell outside the scope of this study, I also collected equivalent official documents prepared after 2015. Insofar as these official documents express a philosophy of people's power, it is sometimes fragmented, ambiguous and contradictory. However, I also collected analysed a wider set of materials which elaborate on those official documents and further fix meanings. These included two 2014 conference speeches, the founding chairman's autobiography, transcripts I generated of two speeches given at Chadema rallies which are available on YouTube, and a further six local Chadema rallies with I attended, recorded and transcribed, all selected for purposively for relevance and accessibility.

Nonetheless, analyzing the discourse which these texts inscribe raises methodological challenges about interpreting meaning and reading both coherence and incoherence. These challenges were compounded by my poor Swahili and my reliance on translations. To address these challenges, I drew on eight years of sustained research about Chadema, including eight months of site-intensive field work in 2015. I attended 24 of its rallies. I interviewed 11 members of Chadema's Central Committee and a further six high-level officials; 14 of its MPs and its nominated parliamentary candidates (of which, five Central Committee members); 86 of its active members and officials, spread across 35 party organs at the zonal, district, ward, branch and foundation-level. Finally, I developed and have maintained correspondences with several senior Chadema members and associated activists. I analysed those documents *intertextually*, in the context of everyday discourse of Chadema to which I have become accustomed. I *reflected* on my perspective and position and how it may affect my interpretation. Finally, I have (*member-*)*checked* my analysis with select Chadema officials and activists.⁸ I relied variously on a translation company and two research

assistants (who wish to remain anonymous) to translate speeches and documents from Swahili which appear herein.

By presenting this analysis of Chadema's discourse, I speak for others who also speak for themselves.⁹ This raises questions of privilege, power and purpose: what can a discourse analysis, conducted from a perspective in the Global North, add that is not evident from these Tanzanians own self-representations? I endeavour to distil the core of Chadema's message as expressed by many voices at many times, and to connect their messages to bodies of thought that they themselves had not fully realized. While Chadema's advocates certainly describe their cause and democratic, they do not, to my knowledge, call it republican. To borrow the words of philosopher Charles Taylor, I reinterpret Chadema's self-interpretations.¹⁰ The authority of my analysis rests on the efficacy of my empirical analysis. However, the final ascription of ideology to Chadema is not for me, but Chadema members to determine.

Dismissing democratic ideas in Africa

The study of ideology begins with a subjectivist premise. There are many perspectives which are equally valid.¹¹ Accordingly, many concepts and claims are not simply true or false but subjectively true. Ernesto Laclau conceives of the discursive as the assertion of such subjective truths as *the* truth or *the* perspective.¹² The discourse-theoretic perspective which he and Chantal Mouffe developed,¹³ and upon which Jason Glynos and David Howarth elaborated, conceptualizes discourse as this fixation of partial systems of meaning.¹⁴ Similarly, Michael Freeden conceives of ideology as constellations of claims that "decontest" concepts which are "essentially contestable."¹⁵ From this parallel ideology studies perspective, ideologies assert the indeterminate as determinate.¹⁶ These systems of claims form frameworks through which the world

becomes interpretable. I adopt these convergent conceptions of ideology and discourse, which I refer to interchangeably.

These retheorizations have ramifications for what counts as an ideology. If ideologies are clusters of ideas that assert meanings, then the realm of the ideological is vast. Freedman writes that “ideologies may come in all shapes and sizes: bombastic, totalizing, doctrinaire; or modest, fragmented, and loose”.¹⁷ This reconceptualization permits the recognition of a greater variety of ideologies. Alongside the grand ideologies of the 20th century – liberalism, communism, socialism, conservatism and fascism – there are countless other ideologies which might be recognized and analysed. Some may constitute extensive systems of thought. Others which are thinner or more partial may not, but they constitute ideologies nonetheless.

This revival and reconceptualization of ideology studies has only been partially echoed in studies of contemporary African political parties. Studies of postcolonial African parties ascribed grand ideologies or their variants generously.¹⁸ Some studies ascribe ideology to contemporary political party messages,¹⁹ especially those by African scholars.²⁰ Indeed, studies analyse the ideological work done beyond party politics by students activists,²¹ youngmen,²² and technocrats,²³ among others.

Despite of all these works, a partial consensus has held in the Africanist literature that post-Cold War political parties’ messages rarely give expression to ideologies.²⁴ In the case of African opposition parties, these messages which in question are about democracy. Jamie Bleck and Nicolas van de Walle determine that opposition messages differ from their ruling party counterparts by focussing on one cluster of issues which they call “democracy and constitutionalism.”²⁵ Some studies ascribed liberal or liberal democratic ideologies to parties in parties in Tanzania and Ghana which focused on these issues,²⁶ claims which have occasionally been repeated since

about parties in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Ghana.²⁷ Nonetheless, studies like these remain the exceptions.²⁸ Most research discounts the possibility that opposition messages about democracy express ideologies.

Often, this ideational derogation is implicit. For example, Rakner and van de Walle report that many opposition parties call for “measures that uphold competitive democracy” only on the next page to describe the common “absence of programmatic politics” among the same parties.²⁹ However, many judgements about the ideologically vacant character of opposition democratic messages were explicit. Some studies infer that opposition messages about democracy do not express ideologies because they are insincere. This incredulity was fuelled by the departure of ostensibly democratic opposition parties from their principles once in office. Altogether, these studies concluded that opposition parties’ messages lacked the stability to qualify as ideological.

Even when opposition parties’ democratic messages are stable, studies nonetheless judge that they rarely express ideologies. They conclude that they espouse at most fragments of democratic ideologies. In this vein, Sebastian Elischer concludes in his study of party manifestoes that Kenyan opposition parties in the 1990s did not merit the ascription of programmatic; while they espoused democratic principles, he writes, they dedicated little space to their policies, and specified little ideological content.³⁰ Altogether, they lack the expansive and coherent structures of thought to qualify as ideologies.

Even when studies encounter democratic messages which are stable, coherent and expansive, they determine nevertheless that they do not express ideologies. This conclusion stems from the premise that the principles of liberal democracy are uncontested in Africa. The reasoning goes that democratic transitions ushered in a

democratic zeitgeist.³¹ Liberal democratic principles were both enshrined in constitutions and embedded in popular opinion.³² Bleck and van de Walle judge that “No one [in politics] can be against democracy”.³³ Electoral authoritarianism regimes abounded, but challenged democratic principles covertly, rather than overtly.³⁴

In this context, studies concluded that opposition messages about democracy took its desirability for granted. Bleck and van de Walle argue that “rather than stressing ideological distinctions within these issue areas, candidates struggle to prove that they are better placed to address challenges of democracy”.³⁵ In other words, their messages convey valence appeals. Of course, as ideologies de-contest meanings, to express sets of ideas as if they were beyond contention is nonetheless ideological.³⁶ Indeed, for contentious claims to become regarded as uncontentious is the essence of ideological hegemony.³⁷ Nevertheless, Bleck and van de Walle emphasize that even though there is a “hegemony of ideas about ‘democratic politics’”³⁸ parties do not “take positions” on them.³⁹ In other words, their use of democratic discourse is passive and derivative. They rehearse it without advocating it. They invoke ideas without contesting “the rightness of a specific position”.⁴⁰

This final line of argument rests on the following premise: that there is a singular democratic ideology. However, as political theorists know only too well, there are many conceptions of and arguments for democracy. Democracy is accepted and rejected; acclaimed and criticized; and contested and re-contested from innumerable voices and causes. For example, in response to so-called one-party democracies, Robert Dahl and his contemporaries argued that it was contestation and competition between parties, rather than participation, that defined liberal democracy.⁴¹ Joseph Schumpeter went as far in his elitist conception of democracy as the competitive election of rulers that participation between elections was undesirable.⁴² A subsequent wave of studies

argued that this minimal conceptions of democracy devalorized participation, and advocated for reforms to realize so-called direct democracy.⁴³ Others did not (only) argue for changes to the now-conventional set of democratic institutions; they saw different things them. A still-ascendant school of thought theorized democracy as deliberative and read deliberative affordances into democratic systems. Bernard Manin argues that these institutions which enable citizens to periodically elect rulers without mandate, constitute a mode of rule distinct from democracy: representative government.⁴⁴ Nadia Urbinati leads an (ascendant) alternative perspective by arguing that in democracies, people exercise sovereignty through the will and election, and through their informal power of opinion.⁴⁵ As Freedman argues, works of political theory are simultaneously works of political ideology.⁴⁶ Therefore, these are all different democratic ideologies which call for distinct (extra-)institutional configurations, offer different arguments for them, and advance frameworks which yield different subjective interpretations of what the same institutions would constitute.

Therefore, the argument that democratic messages merely rehearse hegemonic ideas is specious. Even if the principles of democracy are widely accepted, it does not follow that all conceptions of it or arguments for it are. Therefore, even if democracy is accepted, there is intellectual space for political parties to articulate multiple ideologies which champion it. Therefore, opposition parties' democratic message are not necessarily ideologically vacant.

Recent works by Portia Roelofs, Jeffrey Paller, Sa'eed Husaini and others break with this consensus.⁴⁷ I envisage this article as contributing to this same intellectual project. I argue that not only *could* there be diversity in the democratic ideologies which African opposition parties express, but there *is* such diversity My claim is not only about potentiality, but actuality. Specifically, I argue that a democratic ideology is

present which has not been ascribed to a contemporary political party in Africa before: republicanism.

Republicanism

Republicanism is an intellectual tradition with its roots in antiquity, in early modern Europe and in the “age of revolution.”⁴⁸ There are many republicanism with distinct and contested meanings. There may be no set of shared core claims which unite them. However, there are common patterns of thought running through historic republican thinking which connect them. Studies of republicanism as a normative theory and a meaning-fixing ideology are in-formation; therefore, this overview is tentative. With that qualifier aside, first, republicans foreground the “common interest” or public good as an ideal that government ought to pursue.⁴⁹ See, for example, Machiavelli, Harrington, Montesquieu and Madison.⁵⁰ Second, republicans foreground corruption. Machiavelli, following Aristotle, conceives of corruption as the degeneration of a regime to one in which rulers pursue their sectional or individual interests over the common interests, such as rule of the few.⁵¹ So do Harrington and Montesquieu.⁵² Third, republicans foreground domination. Machiavelli, again, following Aristotle, conceives of two humours, that of the powerful to dominate others, and that of the powerless to evade domination. He understands some body to have achieved domination when it rules in its interest over the common interest.⁵³ Madison understands “tyranny” to mean the same.⁵⁴ Cicero conceives of liberty not as freedom from interference but from the possibility of *arbitrary* interference, or non-domination.⁵⁵ This republican conception of freedom or “Roman liberty” was articulated by republicans “commonwealth” republicans.⁵⁶ They define of domination as a relationship of power like that between master and servant, in which master has the power to intervene arbitrarily.⁵⁷ For Harrington, like Machiavelli, this liberty of the

commonwealth is realized through the distribution of power, specifically, through the equality of power between men.⁵⁸

Recently, republicanism has been revisited and revived. Contemporary republicanism falls into two strains. The first, neo-republicanism, is advocated principally by Philip Pettit.⁵⁹ He draws on Cicero and the commonwealth tradition. He elevates freedom as non-domination as the ultimate goal of republicanism.⁶⁰ He reconceives of corruption as individual illicit behaviour of officials and diminishes its importance.⁶¹ Following Madison, he anticipates the recurrent threat of domination through the state by officials in particular.

Radical republicanism varies. Some, like neo-republicanism, prioritize non-domination, but focus on domination in everyday life: in the home, the workplace and the public square.⁶² Others, such as John McCormick and Camila Vergara, draw on Machiavelli and through him, Aristotle. They elevate the concept of oligarchic corruption: state-capture by the few. This corruption affects not individuals, but the system, whereby oligarchic domination of the state is embedded in an extra-state structure of power which circumvents (liberal democratic) checks upon it. Therefore, they conceive of (systemic) corruption and domination as interconnected.

Contemporary republican *prescriptions* cluster around two themes. First, republicans prescribe limited, constitutional government. Early-modern republicans embraced took their inspiration from these ancient ideas of mixed government and designed constitutions which blended and deviated from prior ideal-typical government forms in attempts to divide and balance powers.⁶³ The US Constitution became emblematic of what Pettit described as the “consensus on institutional matters... among traditional republican writers”.⁶⁴ *The Federalist Papers* present republican reasons for its adoption. They argue that its design prevents the emergence of domination by

tyrants, factions and majority⁶⁵ through “balances and checks”.⁶⁶ Neo-republicans adopt these institutional measures as their chief prescriptions.

Second, republicans prescribe popular empowerment. Some neo-republicanisms advocate that citizens be institutionally empowered to keep vigil against domination by the state.⁶⁷ Radical republicanisms argue that conventional institutional checks and balances are insufficient to prevent oligarchic domination in the state or private relations. McCormick and Vergara advocate the establishment of a plebeian branch of government to empower “the plebs,” “the many” against “the few.”⁶⁸ Others advocate further popular empowerment through extra-constitutional means such as political parties, social movements and direct action.⁶⁹ Lawrence Hamilton, following Harrington, conceives of power itself as freedom.⁷⁰

Therefore, republican ideologies are not necessarily democratic. Republican and democratic ideologies advocate different freedoms and powers. Theories of representative democracy in the mould of Urbinati’s advocate the “political liberty” of collective self-rule. It conceives of representative democracy as the exercise of sovereignty of the people *through* the power of the democratic state. In contrast, neo-republicans advocate *limiting* the arbitrary power of the state to preserve the people’s “Roman liberty” from domination. Some radical republicans advocate making people or plebs free by empowering them *against* the state, or by empowering them against “the few” in and beyond the state. I refer to these democratic, neo-republican and radical-republican conceptions of freedom and power below.

These distinctions have often set republicans and democrats against one another.⁷¹ However, contemporary republicanisms, neo- and radical alike, are simultaneously democratic. They embrace the features of democratic constitutionalism and present them as the means to achieve collective self-rule *and* republican ideals.⁷²

Therefore, republicanism is one family of ideologies which can be articulated in advocacy of democracy, but it is not the only one; nor is it identical to others.

One would be forgiven for assuming that all democrats agree on the points of institutional design advocated by republican democrats, but they do not. Put aside questions of presidential and parliamentary systems which preoccupy students of comparative government, and which by degrees correspond to republican interests in checking and balancing. Schumpeter advocates that citizens not be able to hold their rulers accountable between elections in the ways that both neo- and radical republicans advocate.⁷³ Bernard Manin carries the torch for these ideas today.⁷⁴ Some advocates of direct democracy and deliberative forums would give them powers which stand in opposition to the division of powers which republicans hold dear.⁷⁵ While many bodies of democratic thought do agree on the policies republicans espouse, they advance different understandings of what those policies constitute. Take the thought of nineteenth century liberalism exemplified by John Stuart Mill. He advocates a variant on the then British system. This is the very system which Montesquieu celebrates for creating a balance of powers, but Mill argue in direct contradiction of him that this system does not, and should not create such a balance.⁷⁶

These differences play out even by degrees even between the thought of republican democratic thought and exemplar democratic theorist Robert Dahl. He relegates corruption.⁷⁷ He omits from his overview of arguments for democracy that democracy is instrumental to anti-corruption. He makes this point only fleetingly as the aphorism “power corrupts” in a parenthetical point.⁷⁸ For Dahl, corruption is an afterthought. For republicans, it is a chief animating concern. In a similar vein, Dahl elevates the deliberative in democracy. By contrasts, republicans relegate it.

Therefore, even if the principles of liberal democracy are widely accepted, the expression of a democratic republicanism would not be the empty reiteration of already-hegemonic ideas, but one of several possible visions of it and arguments for it. In the following sections, I interpret Chadema's message between 2006 and 2015. I argue that Chadema articulated a democratic republicanism. Therefore, I determine that an opposition party articulated an ideology in support of democracy, and did so neither passively nor derivatively.

Chadema's people power philosophy

Chadema's official documents describe it as ideologically "centrist"⁷⁹ or "liberal"⁸⁰ and characterize these terms as equivalent.⁸¹ The connotation of this liberal centrism was that it advocated a regulated market economy. Max Mmuyu and Amon Chalighula portrayed Chadema as pro-business party.⁸² The party was founded by businesspersons connected to the elite Legion Club. They were led by fiscally-conservative and former World Bank economist Edwin Mtei.⁸³ Ostensibly, this remains Chadema's ideology. It remains affiliated to the conservative International Democratic Union.⁸⁴ In 2014, the party's chairman Freeman Mbowe told the party conference "CHADEMA believes in building up a state economy based on free market approach that respects and protects rights and private property, free market and private sector."⁸⁵ However, a second generation of leaders arose between 2004 and 2015. Under their leadership, the Chadema developed a parallel discourse which assumed greater prominence in its public-facing message. These changes were drafted and promulgated in the revised version of the party's constitution finalized in 2006. Prior studies describe that it shifted its focus to the issue of resource sovereignty⁸⁶ but most of all to anticorruption⁸⁷ while maintaining its focus on longstanding focus on democracy.⁸⁸ This simultaneous focus on anticorruption and democracy made Chadema's new message a close approximation

of the typical opposition message distilled in the literature. Chadema developed and distilled this message progressively until August 2015 when it nominated CCM-defector Edward Lowassa as its presidential candidate. Lowassa was infamous for corruption led to an interruption in Chadema's discourse. I set 2006 and August 2015 as the boundaries of my analysis to encapsulate this moment of partial discursive consistency.

Analysts and Chadema intellectuals alike disagree on what this change in message represents. Some argued that shift change in message represented a leftward shift. Central Committee member and 2020 presidential candidate Tundu Lissu said "From around 2005, we began to move leftward... way to the left."⁸⁹ Similarly, long-time Central Committee member Mwesiga Baregu said Chadema opened its "doors to all progressive forces demanding change."⁹⁰ Others, like academic Chambi Chachage, maintain that despite becoming "a broad church", Chadema ultimately remained "a business-oriented party."⁹¹ Some argue that Chadema message relegated its own ideology in its public-facing message. Journalist Athuman Mtulya judged "that Chadema flourished out of an anti-corruption agenda, and not out of a party ideology of conservatism."⁹² Similarly, Baregu judged that "the debates that we are engaged in are not highly ideological."⁹³ Indeed, the party's own 2014 ideology handbook lamented that Chadema MPs rarely invoke the party's ideology or philosophy in parliament.⁹⁴

I argue that none of these readings encapsulates fully Chadema's shifting ideological claim-making. Chadema did indeed incorporate a growing breadth of partially contradictory opinion. Nonetheless, it articulated an increasingly coherent, if partial set of ideas between 2006 and 2015. Chadema's 2006 constitution declares that in addition to having a centrist ideology, it has a "philosophy of 'People's Power and Authority'".⁹⁵ Indeed, "people's power" is the party's more enduring slogan, which is

called and answered at every Chadema event I have witnessed. Chadema's authoritative statement of this philosophy is brief. Its constitution expresses this philosophy in fewer than 400 words, many of which are vague and platitudinous. Nonetheless, I argue that this nascent philosophy, rather than any centrist or liberal ideology, was most prominent in Chadema's public-facing discourse. In fact, through countless speeches, texts and everyday utterances, Chadema leaders and members alike developed its people's power philosophy asserted and configured a more substantive and consistent set of ideas around it. As this discourse is expressed by many texts and many voices, it is necessarily fragmented, ambiguous and sometimes contradictory. Nonetheless, I propose that this sometimes-amorphous set of ideas builds upon and partially fixes the meaning of Chadema's people's power philosophy. This philosophy does not extend to every conceivable topic. Nor does it resolve the left-right contradictions described above. Nonetheless, it amounts to a set of claims which fix meaning and through which the world becomes interpretable. Therefore, it constitutes an ideology in Freeden's terms.⁹⁶ Specifically, it approximates a republican ideology, no matter how fragmented or fluid.

Republican diagnosis

Chadema's republican ideology began with the claim that Tanzania was beset by corruption. A succession of corruption scandals emerged between 2001 and 2014, peaking in the period 2006 to 2009. Chadema wove these together. It described them as instances of *ufisadi* or "grand corruption". It alleged that these instances stemmed from a conspiracy at the pinnacle of government. In 2007, Chadema's then-secretary-general Wilbroad Slaa published a "List of Shame" which named nine presidents, prime ministers, politicians and senior civil servants as the chief perpetrators and beneficiaries. Chadema claimed that this conspiracy had captured the state and altered its behaviour in

their private interests. Mbowe said “the people serving the government of few people having usurped power from the people”.⁹⁷ Furthermore, it alleged that this elite network connected government and big business. Chadema’s 2015 manifesto states that “corruption connects the public and private sectors where the biggest money for corruption comes from”.⁹⁸ In doing so, Chadema articulated a discourse to which many extra-party voices contributed. For example, eight NGOs described “policy capture by private interests and corruption”.⁹⁹ Altogether, consistent with (radical-)republicanisms, Chadema imagined oligarchy, the domination of the state by the few and rule in their private interests over common interests.¹⁰⁰

Chadema conceived of the CCM oligarchic state capture as a self-perpetuating system in which power and corruption were mutually reinforcing.

First, Chadema portrayed CCM as embedded in power. This involved little imagination on their part. CCM and the two parties that merged to form it have ruled Tanzania since independence in 1961. Nonetheless, Chadema emphasized that CCM is dominant, and works to perpetuate that dominance. Chadema conceived of this domination as deliberate. Mbowe wrote that “The government is determined to hold onto power by all means”.¹⁰¹ In fact, the espousal of Chadema’s philosophy in its constitution locates contemporary oligarchic dominance in a national history of domination by others.

...the “people” of Tanzania have never had a voice, power and authority over decisions on the fate of people’s life...from the colonial era to date.¹⁰²

Therefore, consistent with republicanism, Chadema elevated domination as the defining theme of its truncated history of Tanzania.

Second, Chadema asserted that CCM’s domination of the state enabled it to practice corruption. It claimed that it CCM deliberately defends “the current

constitutional and legal structure because of the existence of various loop-holes that allow them to mismanage state resources for themselves.”¹⁰³ Chadema’s constitution states that this structure has persisted because “the country’s Constitution has remained a monopoly of the Government”.¹⁰⁴ In effect, it claimed that CCM exercised dominance to deliberately preserve a system which permits corruption. CCM’s unchecked power enabled it to practice corruption, not only through manipulation of the state but through state predation on ordinary Tanzanians. Describing local extra-legal taxes, Lissu said “It’s basically an extortionist racket. Rural people are exploited and oppressed... There is no pretence of rule of law. It is rule of the law of force” which amounted to “rural tyranny.”¹⁰⁵ Therefore, Chadema imagined CCM corruption as not only harmful to Tanzanians, but exploitative of them.

Third, not only did domination enable corruption; in Chadema’s view, corruption enabled domination. Corruption was a means to subjugate citizens. CCM used ill-gotten wealth to defeat the opposition in election campaigns. Lissu said “you don’t compete with CCM on money. They will simply *overwhelm* you with their trailer-loads of cash [emphasis added]”.¹⁰⁶ Equally, CCM used corruptly-gotten wealth to buy votes. Chadema presented vote-buying as predatory. Baregu wrote that vote-buying “exploits the vulnerabilities of the population (poverty, ignorance, ill-health and fear).”¹⁰⁷ This predation enabled systemic exploitation. Then Chadema parliamentary candidate Jesca Kishoa pointed out that by buying votes so cheaply, CCM politicians are able to return to office and get richer.¹⁰⁸ In all these cases, Chadema imagined CCM using its wealth to take advantage of others’ poverty to control them.

Chadema saw subjugation not only in the way that corruption was used to preserve CCM power but in the way coercion was too. Mbowe said that: “our party was harassed from all sides at all levels including killing of party members in meetings”.¹⁰⁹

Slaa claimed that the state subjected not only activists but citizens to violent oppression. He described “the wanton misuse of state and security organs to make innocent citizens insecure by banning public rallies [they] not only used excessive force, but even killed innocent people.”¹¹⁰

Altogether, Chadema imagined a system in which CCM continually achieved dominance and enabled corruption. It did so by simultaneously subjugating and exploiting Tanzanians. Slaa captured this combination of power and predation by describing CCM as “a monster that eats both one’s flesh and bones.”¹¹¹ In a similar vein, emphasising CCM’s manipulation, Kigaila compared CCM to a mosquito that promises to have a treatment for malaria.¹¹² This view is summarized in Chadema’s constitution, which states that:

being elected to form government does not mean to usurp PEOPLE’s power and to use those powers to suppress the very electorates to defend narrow personal interests instead of the interest of the wider public.¹¹³

Altogether, Chadema advanced a (radical-)republican critical interpretation of the state quo. It imagined a state that was systematically corrupt which was run in the interests of an oligarchy centred on CCM but spanning big-business and the state. The oligarchy practiced corruption by dominating the state. It maintained its dominance by continually overpowering Tanzanian citizens that might challenge it. This closely resembles the radical republican idea of systemic corruption.¹¹⁴

Republican prognosis

To address these ills in the long-term, Chadema advocated what Kimesera described as “a new structure of governance.” He elaborated “we do not, Chadema, take over from CCM and become another CCM.”¹¹⁵ Chadema’s prioritization of democracy was built into its constitution, and indeed, into its name. It advocated democratic “systems and

structures of governance”.¹¹⁶ These explicitly include the protection of individual liberties, the rule of law, media freedom, judicial independence, the limitation of the executive, a stronger parliament, and devolution (*majimboism*), among other things.¹¹⁷

These ideas found synthesis in the constitution-making process, which was initiated by President Kikwete in 2011. Retired CCM-politician Joseph Warioba led a commission which drafted a constitution in 2013. Chadema and other opposition parties embraced this so-called Warioba Draft, even after it was dropped. The Warioba Draft significantly reduced the executive’s powers. It altered the federal system of government and transferred powers from the centre to two subnational governments. It created a supreme court, made supreme justice nomination subject to parliamentary approval, and strengthened the independence of the judiciary. It created an independent electoral commission, and it extended the list and scope of the human rights it recognized. These are consistent with (neo-)republican prescriptions.

Yet this platform was republican not only in the measures prescribed but the justifications given for them. It’s constitution states that it would realize “a free society” by limiting state power. Once power was no longer “in the hands of few people”, it could no longer be used to “oppress citizens.”¹¹⁸ A later document said that the Warioba Draft would “set and categorically state the separation of powers and principles of checks and balances.”¹¹⁹ This emphasis on the institutional limitation of state power to achieve freedom is consistent with (neo-)republicanism

Equally, Chadema claimed that constitutional reforms would bring about a “free society” by empowering citizens to check state power. It called for a “people’s constitution that would give them [the people] authority to control rulers.”¹²⁰ Rulers would be controlled by being “questioned and held accountable by the people.”¹²¹ This constitutes one (neo-)republican meaning of “people’s power” in Chadema’s

philosophy: institutional empowerment (and in context, freedom) of people to check an otherwise arbitrary state power.

Equally, Chadema's leaders justify these constitutional reforms as the realization of the people's "sovereign autonomy".¹²² Chadema official Deogratias Munishi said "The public should be the voice of its own."¹²³ Slaa said "that the powers and decisions to plan and exploit opportunities in the country will be in the people's hands..."¹²⁴ This constitutes a second, democratic meaning of "people's power" in Chadema's philosophy: the power (and in context, freedom) to collective self-rule.

Altogether, Chadema advocated institutional measures consistent the principles of constitutional democracy. Its people power philosophy contains both republican and democratic arguments in support of them. It argued that these measures would achieve neo-republican freedom from domination and democratic freedom to collectively self-govern. These ideas are not always clear in single documents, but they become evident when read in the context of other texts, speeches and remarks.

Emancipatory and collective struggle

Republican thought inhered not only in the diagnosis that Chadema offered or the solutions it prescribed, but in the radical republican ways in which it imagined realising them. Chadema advocated the overthrow of CCM as prior to the implementation of its republican institutional reforms. It conceived of the achievement of these twin goals as a "second liberation".¹²⁵ Therefore, it was an emancipatory project. Like other self-styled liberation projects,¹²⁶ it conceived of liberation as not only a teleological endpoint, but the process to realize it, or "our struggle to liberate our nation [emphasis added]".¹²⁷ Chadema conceived of it as a struggle because it took place against an opponent: CCM. Chadema claimed that to achieve liberation, it would have to "fight against CCM hegemony",¹²⁸ the very system of domination which it claimed made

Tanzania unfree. Lissu said that this was the “kind of militancy that drove my politics.”¹²⁹ Therefore, it understood the struggle as a contest of power and the overthrow of CCM as an overpowering of CCM.

Chadema construed popular involvement as necessarily for the struggle. While it would lead the struggle, Tanzanians would have to participate en masse for it to succeed.¹³⁰ Kimesera said that “there has to be a change in the people themselves.”¹³¹ Similarly, Lissu said that “They knew that to deal with the issues that had confronted them all these years they had to organize themselves.”¹³² As such, Chadema took the mobilization of people as a necessary part of the struggle. Indeed, Chadema planned and executed a succession of operations¹³³ intended to “send our ideologies, our policies through public rallies.”¹³⁴

Popular participation in the struggle was necessary, in Chadema’s view, because it imagined the overpowering of CCM as a *popular* overpowering. As Lissu put it, “I was calling for rebellion.”¹³⁵ It envisaged breaking CCM’s subjugation of people as the path to overthrowing it. Chadema asked citizens to undo CCM’s system of domination through resistance. This involved covert action. Slaa said that, encouraged by Chadema, people increasingly “refused to be harassed and intimidated and began to mount open protest.”¹³⁶ Chadema portrayed these acts of “resistance from below”¹³⁷ themselves as emancipatory. As CCM’s domination was achieved through the subjugation of people, to break that subjugation meant liberating themselves from it. As Mwakibete summarized, “It was a story, that they [Chadema] told, that the common man and woman could liberate themselves if they so chose.”¹³⁸ Therefore, Chadema conceived of popular empowerment through resistance to subjugation as emancipation from a dominating state. This constitutes a third and republican meaning of people’s power in Chadema’s philosophy: freedom as power.

While Chadema conceived of the struggle as popular, it simultaneously conceived of it as collective, and imagined itself as the vehicle for that struggle. Between 2004 and 2014, Chadema converged on the conclusion that to defeat CCM, it must organize branch-by-branch.¹³⁹ One party document states that “the party’s strength must come out of the and should be built within the people at the grass root levels.”¹⁴⁰ Therefore, Chadema assumed a special status in the struggle. It imagines that it was the collective organ through which CCM dominance would be broken. Slaa proclaimed that “CHADEMA has now been embraced as ‘Tanzanians hope’ and specifically the oppressed people.”¹⁴¹

Altogether, Chadema discursively rendered organising the party equivalent to empowering people, which in turn, in (radical-)republican terms, signified emancipation. Slaa claimed that “CHADEMA visits, rallies, public meetings, demonstrations and internal meetings...are the start of the second liberation”.¹⁴² Therefore, a variant on the third republican meaning of “people’s power” in Chadema’s philosophy was as collective and extra-constitutional power as freedom, and accordingly, collective empowerment as emancipation.

Conclusion

In this article, I have demonstrated that there was and is a strain of republican democratic thought in contemporary African party politics. It was articulated by Chadema through its people’s power philosophy. This partial and in-formation ideology mixed neo-republican, radical-republican and democratic ideas to form an original hybrid. It claimed that Tanzanian state, and through it, Tanzanians, were dominated by a CCM oligarchy which ruled in its private interests. It imagined an interconnected system of corruption and subjugation through which CCM sustained its domination. It advocated the overthrow and the reform of this system by the introduction of a

programme of constitutional reform. This overthrow would achieve individual, neo-republican freedom from an otherwise arbitrary state and the positive democratic freedom of collective self-rule. It also portrayed the overthrow as a liberatory struggle, in which people must participate, and through which they would be empowered as they broke CCM's dominance. It presented itself as the collective vehicle for that popular emancipation. While Chadema leaders were divided on the economy, they shared this people power philosophy. In Baregu's words: "People's power, that's our slogan. That has never been a slogan of the right-wing. That way, Chadema was able to accommodate people of my [left-wing] disposition."¹⁴³

While Chadema is the first contemporary African party to which a republican democratic ideology has been ascribed, it is unlikely to be the only republican voice on the continent. A cluster of opposition movements speak in similar terms to Chadema. Perhaps most notably, Bobi Wine and the National Unity Platform advocate the liberation Uganda from what he describes as Museveni's tyrannical regime.¹⁴⁴ Like Chadema, they advocate the institution of democracy. Like Chadema, they envisage "people's power" as the means to realize those goals. Similarly, Zimbabwe's Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance portrays the ruling party as corrupt, violent and authoritarian. It advocates the principles of democracy and human rights. And it conceives of the path to achieve those goals as a popular overpowering of the ruling party which its leader called "a people's struggle hijacked and waylaid struggle of democratization."¹⁴⁵

Future research should explore whether and to what extent other African parties' ideologies resemble democratic republicanism or original hybrids borne of them. It should start with opposition parties in post-liberation authoritarian regimes. These regimes make domination and corruption particularly ripe for opposition critique.¹⁴⁶ It

should also look back. Prior research may have written-off democratic principles as ideologically unfaithful or vacant may mischaracterized them. This research should be revisited and perhaps, revised. In particular, the movements that fought for and won democratic transitions in the 1980s and 1990s ought to be reinterpreted. However, future research should not stop there. Not only does political thought roam freely, sometimes appearing and taking root in unforeseeable places and ways. Republicanisms have prima facie sense-making power in Africa, and indeed world-wide. Domination and corruption are both prominent features of African presents and pasts, in everyday and academic discourses alike.¹⁴⁷

Republicanisms aside, the case of Chadema illustrates the diversity of democratic thought. This variety of ideas is common-sensical to students of political theory, but little recognized in studies of contemporary African party politics. Future research should study democratic ideas among contemporary African party messages. It should explore the diversity in the political thought that they express. It should consider whether they resemble, blend, or depart from other democratic ideologies.

This is a fitting historic moment in which to reconsider the intellectual content of democratic ideas. This article is published at a time in which the partial democratic hegemony of the recent past has been fractured. It is disfigured by some,¹⁴⁸ overtly rejected by others and contradicted in actions of many.¹⁴⁹ Understanding how democracy is understood and championed is more important than ever. This is true as Tanzania as much as anywhere. Between 2015 and 2020, President Magufuli led the introduction of an extreme authoritarian agenda which culminated in elimination of Chadema in the official 2020 election results.¹⁵⁰ Putting aside any speculation about Chadema's future, that context gives this article the air of an indeterminate obituary. Chadema's message from 2016 to 2020 deserves its own study, but the republicanism

aspects of its discourse seem only to have gained greater prominence in this period. Whatever Chadema's future holds, its cause may live on through its ideas, and that makes understanding them all the more vital.

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Endnotes

¹ Bleck van de Walle, *Electoral Politics*.

² *ibid.*

³ Hammersley, *Republicanism*.

⁴ Vergara, *Systemic Corruption*; Pettit, *Republicanism*.

⁵ Paget, "Tanzania: Shrinking Space;" Paget, "Tanzania: The Authoritarian Landslide."

⁶ Hamilton, *Freedom Is Power*; Leipold et al, *Radical Republicanism*.

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- ⁷ Roelofs, “Transparency;” Paller, “Dignified;” Husaini, “Beyond.”
- ⁸ Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, *Interpretive*.
- ⁹ Alcoff, “The Problem.”
- ¹⁰ Taylor, “Interpretation.”
- ¹¹ Laclau and Mouffe, “Post-Marxism.”
- ¹² Laclau, *Politics and Ideology*.
- ¹³ Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony*.
- ¹⁴ Glynos and Howarth, *Logics*.
- ¹⁵ Freedden, “Ideology.”
- ¹⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁷ Ibid, 1
- ¹⁸ See, for example, Young, *Ideology*; Coleman and Rosberg, *National Integration*.
- ¹⁹ See, for example, Dorman, *Understanding Zimbabwe*; Beresford et al, “Liberation Movements;” for an overview, see Paget, “Election Campaigns.”
- ²⁰ See, for example: Husaini, “Beyond;” Gebregziabher, “Ideology;” Raftopoulos, “Problematising;” Opalo and Smith, “Ideology.”
- ²¹ Hodgkinson and Melchiorre, “Introduction.”
- ²² Allman, *The Quills*.
- ²³ Dye, “Ideology Matters.”
- ²⁴ Rakner and van de Walle, “Opposition;” Carbone, “Political Parties.”
- ²⁵ Bleck and van de Walle, *Electoral Politics*; Bleck and van de Walle, “Valence Issues.”
- ²⁶ Mmuyu and Chaligha, *Political Parties*; Jeffries and Thomas, “The Ghanaian.”
- ²⁷ Whitfield, “‘Change’;” Mac Giollaibhuí, “How,” Gallagher and Chan, *Why Mugabe Won*.
- ²⁸ Cheeseman, *Democracy*.
- ²⁹ Rakner and van de Walle, “Opposition,” 117-8.
- ³⁰ Elischer, *Political Parties*, 58, 67 and 72.

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- ³¹ Bratton and van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial.”
- ³² Bratton and Mattes, “Africans”; Mattes and Bratton, “Do Africans.”
- ³³ Bleck and van de Walle, “Valence Issues,” 1405-6.
- ³⁴ Morse, “The Era.”
- ³⁵ Bleck and van de Walle, “Parties,” 1132-3.
- ³⁶ Freedden, “Ideology.”
- ³⁷ Glynos and Howarth, *Logics*.
- ³⁸ Bleck and van de Walle, *Electoral Politics*, 9.
- ³⁹ *Ibid*, 9.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid*.
- ⁴¹ Dahl, *On Democracy*.
- ⁴² Schumpeter, *Capitalism*.
- ⁴³ Altman, *Direct Democracy*.
- ⁴⁴ Manin, *The Principles*.
- ⁴⁵ Urbinati, *Representative*.
- ⁴⁶ Freedden, “Ideology.”
- ⁴⁷ Paller, “Dignified;” Roelofs, “Transparency;” Husaini, “Beyond.”
- ⁴⁸ Hammersley, *Republicanism*.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid*; Machiavelli, *Discourses*; Harrington, *The Commonwealth*, First Part of the Preliminaries.
- ⁵⁰ Machiavelli, *Discourses*; Harrington, *The Commonwealth*; Montesquieu, *Selected*; Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, Paper 10.
- ⁵¹ Vergara, *Systematic Corruption*, McCormick, *Machiavellian*; Machiavelli, *Discourses*.
- ⁵² Harrington, *The Commonwealth*; Montesquieu, *Selected*.
- ⁵³ Machiavelli, *Discourses*.
- ⁵⁴ Hamilton, Madison and Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, paper 10.

⁵⁵ Skinner, *Liberty*.

⁵⁶ This interpretation is advanced in Pettit, *Republicanism*.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Harrington, *The Commonwealth*, First Part of the Preliminaries

⁵⁹ Pettit, *Republicanism*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, Chapter 7.

⁶² Leipold, Nabulsi, and White, *Radical Republicanism*.

⁶³ Harrington, *The Commonwealth*; Montesquieu, *Selected*.

⁶⁴ Pettit, *Republicanism*, 172

⁶⁵ Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, especially papers 9, 10, 39, 47, 48 and 51.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁶⁷ Pettit, *On the People's Terms*.

⁶⁸ McCormick, *Machiavellian*; Vergara, *Systemic Corruption*.

⁶⁹ Leipold, Nabulsi, and White, *Radical Republicanism*; Hamilton, *Power*.

⁷⁰ Hamilton, *Power*.

⁷¹ Urbinati, "Democracy and Republicanism."

⁷² Some contest whether these reconciliations of democratic and republican theory are satisfactory. See Urbinati, "Democracy and Republicanism."

⁷³ Schumpeter, *Capitalism*.

⁷⁴ Manin, *The Principles*.

⁷⁵ Altman, *Direct Democracy*.

⁷⁶ Mill, *On Liberty*, 269.

⁷⁷ Dahl, *On Democracy*, Chapter 5.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 73-4; corruption receives still less attention in Dahl, *Democracy*, 77.

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- ⁷⁹ Chadema, *Constitution*.
- ⁸⁰ Chadema, *Foundations*.
- ⁸¹ Ibid 78.
- ⁸² Mmuyu and Chaligha, *Political Parties*.
- ⁸³ Mtei, *From Goatherd*.
- ⁸⁴ *International Democratic Union*, “Member Parties.”
- ⁸⁵ Mbowe, speech.
- ⁸⁶ Jacob and Pedersen, “New;” Becker, “Remembering.”
- ⁸⁷ Nyaluke and Connolly, “The Role;” Babeiya, “Multiparty Elections.”
- ⁸⁸ Paget, ‘The Authoritarian Origins;’ Fouéré, “Tanzania’s 2015 Elections;” Taylor, “Lowassa Joins Chadema.”
- ⁸⁹ Lissu, interview, June 2015.
- ⁹⁰ Baregu, interview.
- ⁹¹ Chachage, “Magufuli.”
- ⁹² Mtulya, interview.
- ⁹³ Baregu, interview.
- ⁹⁴ Chadema, *Foundations*, 38.
- ⁹⁵ Chadema, *Constitution*.
- ⁹⁶ Freedden, “Ideology.”
- ⁹⁷ Mbowe, speech.
- ⁹⁸ Original text: ‘..rushwa siyo kwamba iko sekta ya umma pekee yake bali inaunganisha sekta za umma na sekta za binafsi ambako ndio fedha kubwa ya rushwa zinakotoka.’ Chadema, ‘Election Manifesto,’ 13.
- ⁹⁹ Policy Forum, “Press Statement.”
- ¹⁰⁰ Vergara, *Systemic Corruption*.
- ¹⁰¹ Mbowe, ‘A Dangerous Shift.’

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- ¹⁰² Chadema, *Constitution*.
- ¹⁰³ Mbowe, speech.
- ¹⁰⁴ Chadema, *Constitution*, 15.
- ¹⁰⁵ Lissu, *interview*.
- ¹⁰⁶ Lissu, *interview*.
- ¹⁰⁷ Baregu, “How Ignorance.”
- ¹⁰⁸ Kishoa, “Speech.”
- ¹⁰⁹ Mbowe, ‘Speech.’
- ¹¹⁰ Slaa, “Report.”
- ¹¹¹ The exact quote from the transcript is ‘*Zimwi likujalo siyo tu linakula na kumaliza bali hata mifupa haitaonekana japo kila siku wanakuja na kauli tamu tamu*’. Slaa, speech.
- ¹¹² Kigaila, *interview*.
- ¹¹³ Chadema, *Constitution*, 16
- ¹¹⁴ Vergara, *Systematic Corruption*.
- ¹¹⁵ Kimesera, *interview*.
- ¹¹⁶ Chadema, *Constitution*.
- ¹¹⁷ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁸ Ibid
- ¹¹⁹ Chadema, *Chadema Policy*.
- ¹²⁰ Chadema, “Election Manifesto.”
- ¹²¹ Chadema, *Constitution*.
- ¹²² Chadema, *Foundations*.
- ¹²³ Munishi, *interview*.
- ¹²⁴ Slaa, speech.
- ¹²⁵ Ibid.
- ¹²⁶ Beresford, *South Africa’s*.”

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- ¹²⁷ Mbowe, speech.
- ¹²⁸ Slaa, speech.
- ¹²⁹ Lissu, interview.
- ¹³⁰ Chadema, *Foundations*.
- ¹³¹ Kimesera, interview.
- ¹³² Lissu, interview.
- ¹³³ Paget, “The Authoritarian Origins.”
- ¹³⁴ Kigaila, interview.
- ¹³⁵ Lissu, interview.
- ¹³⁶ Slaa, speech.
- ¹³⁷ Lissu, *interview*.
- ¹³⁸ Mwakibete, interview.
- ¹³⁹ Paget, “The Authoritarian Origins.”
- ¹⁴⁰ Chadema, *Foundations*.
- ¹⁴¹ Slaa, speech.
- ¹⁴² Ibid.
- ¹⁴³ Baregu, interview
- ¹⁴⁴ Luke Melchiorre, “Generational Populism.”
- ¹⁴⁵ Chamisa, “Hope.”
- ¹⁴⁶ Cheeseman, *Democracy*.
- ¹⁴⁷ Mamdani, *Citizen*.
- ¹⁴⁸ Urbinati, *Me the People*.
- ¹⁴⁹ Morse, “The Era.”
- ¹⁵⁰ Paget, “Tanzania: Authoritarian Landslide.”