



## The affinity between the rally and representative claim-making: evidence from Tanzania

Dan Paget

To cite this article: Dan Paget (2023): The affinity between the rally and representative claim-making: evidence from Tanzania, *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, DOI: [10.1080/14662043.2023.2235158](https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2023.2235158)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2023.2235158>



© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group



Published online: 20 Aug 2023.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 66



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

# The affinity between the rally and representative claim-making: evidence from Tanzania

Dan Paget 

Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK

## ABSTRACT

Studies analyse what politicians communicate at rallies. Yet most do so to determine what politicians communicate at large. Therefore, they implicitly assume that what they communicate at rallies is what they communicate across media. I ask: what is particular to the meanings that politicians, and indeed audience members, make at rallies? I theorise the rally as a media genre, in which those present are simplified into two entities (“speakers”; and “audience”) and those entities engage in an asymmetric, interactive dialogue. I argue that these two features of rally genre facilitate, but do not necessitate, the making of representative claims. I analyse “speaker”-“audience” discourse at rallies in Tanzania. I find that politicians use their speech to make representative claims and craft dialogues with “audience” which induce them to co-declare those claims. Therefore, I find that there is an affinity between the rally and representative claim-making.

**ARTICLE HISTORY** Received 17 March 2023; Accepted 16 June 2023

**KEYWORDS** Representation; political communication; rallies; election campaigning; Tanzania

In recent years, representation has been radically rethought (Urbinati, 2006; Saward, 2010; Montanaro, 2017; Disch, 2019, 2021). Conceptions of representation as something factual, achieved through institutional processes and/or the actions of officials, have given way to conceptions of it as something which is, in Michael Saward’s words (2010), innately ‘claimed’. It is hard to convey just how significant that rethinking has proved. Studies, too numerous to list here exhaustively, see changing ideas about who represents whom, and indeed what it is to represent, at the heart of many of great changes and great continuities alike in contemporary politics. In their eyes, the loss of trust in political institutions (Mudde, 2021; Saward, 2010), the rise of populisms (Taggart, 2004; Urbinati, 2019), the rise of far rightisms

**CONTACT** Dan Paget  [daniel.paget@abdn.ac.uk](mailto:daniel.paget@abdn.ac.uk)

© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group  
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.

(Mudde, 2019), the growing strength of authoritarian regimes (de la Torre, 2022; Paget, 2023b) and the legitimization of NGOs in the global periphery (Dodworth, 2022), among many trends, have all taken place through the assertion and contestation of ideas about representation. Representative claims can be made, of course, on any medium of communication. Nevertheless, in this article, I argue that this ground-shaking form of claim-making shares an affinity with one medium in particular: the rally.

Making this argument involves a departure from past research. Previous studies reveal much about what is communicated at rallies, not least, who represents whom (for example, see Alexander, 2010). However, at least implicitly, they analyse what politicians communicate at rallies as indicative of what they communicate in general, as if the rally was, for them, just one other medium for the dissemination for the same message. What I ask in this article is: what meaning-making is particular to the rally. Are some forms of meaning-making scored into the format of the rally itself?

Saward theorises a representative claim as an assertion by a claim-maker that some representative stands for, symbolises, acts for or in some other way represents some constituency. For example, a spin-doctor (claim-maker) claims that a president (representative) embodies the nation (constituency). Such a claim, Saward elaborates, involves an assertion that there is some correspondence between the features of the representative and the constituency; for instance, that the representative mirrors the features of the constituency. Prior to such an assertion of correspondence is the characterisation of both the representative and the constituency as possessing such features. Prior to such characterisations, in turn, is the construction of two entities – one composed of few, one of many - which can be thus characterised. I argue that by simplifying those in attendance at the rally into ‘speakers’ and ‘audience’, a rally pre-constructs a pair of entities which can be characterised as representatives and constituency. Thereby, the rally facilitates representative claim-making. It pre-encodes meanings which can be incorporated into representative claims.

I also argue that the rally facilitates the *co-production* of representative claims. At the rally, ‘speaker’ oratory and audience member response in calls, cheers and applause form communicative interactions. I argue that this interactive format provides an opportunity for ‘the speaker’ to incorporate audience members into representative claim-making in one of two ways. First, ‘the speaker’ can invite their audience members to vocally accept the claim which they make about them, as Saward theorises. Second, they can use their speech to invite audience members to voice opinions, make demands or take-on identities. ‘The speaker’ makes a corresponding characterisation of themselves, such that, together, the self-characterisations of ‘speakers’ and ‘audiences’ form the component parts of representative claims. Such a co-produced representative claim remains one of many equally valid

possible claims. However, it is not, like other such possible claims, based on assertions by some claim-maker. Instead, it is based on how 'the speaker' and 'audience' each present themselves. Therefore, such a co-produced claim enjoys the at least *prima facie* authority of the representative and constituency to each define themselves. It is not only co-produced, but co-declared.

This research began as ethnographic research during Tanzania's 2015 election campaign in Tanzania. It was subsequently complemented by multimedia ethnographic research on Tanzania's 2020 election campaign. Tanzania's election campaigns are what I theorise as 'rally intensive' (Paget, 2019b). In them, the rally is not *only* 'a device to win media coverage' (Paget, 2019b, p. 445) but *also* the principal means of mass face-to-face contact. I immersed myself in the meaning-making at rallies in this extreme case of rally abundance. I generated the theory which I advance here by adopting an 'abductive' approach. I let myself be 'led away' in this exploratory research, in what became a creative and iterative movement back and forth between evidence and theory (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012, pp. 27–28).

In this article, I analyse full-length transcripts from six rallies, which in turn each contains speeches by several politicians of various lengths.<sup>1</sup> I attended 42 rallies as a part of my ethnographic field work in 2015. I recorded and transcribed five of them in full. I generated a sixth transcript from a national *Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo* – the Party of Democracy and Development rally live-streamed on YouTube. The small body of rally transcripts means that these speeches cannot be taken as representative of rally speeches in Tanzania's 2015 campaign, even though they include a spread of locations, parties and speaker juniority/seniority. Nevertheless, these speech transcripts formed a rich basis for theory-generation. They enabled me to hone the claims made here by distilling in what ways representative claims were made at rallies. I iteratively read and analysed how representative claims were made in these texts. After several readings, I distilled a variety of ways in which they were articulated. In the body of the article below, I summarise this variety of representative claim-making. As I did all this, I encountered the challenges of reading meanings which are ambiguous, implicit, and interpretable only in contexts (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). These challenges were compounded by my status as an outsider and my limited Swahili. I met these challenges by interpreting these texts in the context of the ethnographic research which I described above. I further interpreted them in the context of the many Tanzanian rallies which I have watched remotely, not least as part of my multi-media ethnographic research of Tanzania's 2020 election campaign. What I show empirically is that at the rallies which I analyse, representative claims appear frequently and prominently in the discourses of Tanzanian politicians.

Altogether, in this article, I show that the rally is not just another medium through which politicians transmit their messages. I show that the rally has a

special affinity with this form of claim-making at the heart of political contestation. Thereby, I make a contribution at the juncture of rally studies, media studies and interpretive political theory. Future research should further explore the patterned making of representative claims across media. Equally, it should be cognisant of these rally affordances as they analyse how politicians, activists, journalists, mediators and audience members alike choose to produce, co-produce or counter-produce rallies.

In the first section of this article, I argue that past research has neglected the question of what meaning making is particular to the rally. In the second, I introduce the concept of representative claim-making. I develop the argument that rallies enable the making and co-declaration of representative claims. In the third, I show that at rallies in Tanzania, politician-speakers make representative claims. In the fourth, I show that they invite and induce the co-declaration of such claims by audience members. In the fifth, I illustrate that, in spite of the power of “the speaker”, audience members at rallies can always contest representative claims made about them. Finally, I conclude.

### **Political communication and rallies**

Communication at rallies is important. As researchers have long recognised, in many places and times, ‘rallies are employed by [political] leaders to win and stylise media coverage’ (Paget, 2019b, p. 450). Equally, in many places and times, large numbers of people also attend rallies in person. These are both forms of what I (2019b) theorise as ‘rally-intensiveness’; the intensity with which media, no matter how deep or shallow their reach, re-mediate rallies; and the intensity with which rallies are attended in person.

Recent research reveals much about *what* politicians communicate to “audiences” at rallies. Take studies of Donald Trump rallies. A series of recent studies offer insights into the variety of claims which he made through speech and performance at rallies (Lacatus, 2020; Montgomery, 2020; Karakaya & Edgell, 2021; Valcore et al., 2021). Among them are observations, albeit in different terminologies, that at them, Trump made and co-produced representative claims (Montgomery, 2020; Karakaya & Edgell, 2021). These studies also contain many potential insights into what is specific to the meanings that are made at rallies, and what meaning-making, if any, the rally facilitates. However, those insights are obscured in these studies by this fact: the meanings which they determine that Trump expressed at rallies closely resemble the meanings which other studies determine that he made and communicated in general. For example, Valcore et al. (2021) determine that at rallies, Trump used his speech at rallies to construct and vilify a series of foreign, immigrant, non-Christian, non-white others. Yet these are conclusion which are *also* reached about what far right politicians

communicate at large (Mudde, 2019). Karakaya and Edgell (2021) determine that at rallies, Trump constructed: a corrupt elite; a white, male, Christian and moral people as nation, or 'real Americans'; a narrative arc in which that greatness of that people and nation are restored; and Trump's personal role in that arc as a representative of the people, outsider, businessman, hero, and winner who will bring about that restoration. Yet this too closely echoes conclusions reached by other fine-grained analyses of what Trump and indeed other (radical right) populists communicate *across* media (Mudde, 2004, 2019; Schneiker, 2019).

In a similar vein, others argue that other populists 'draw "the people" on stage' at rallies (Fraser, 2017, p. 456) and use rallies to perform their own extraordinariness (de la Torre, 2022). However, once again, many studies stipulate that all populists do just that, irrespective of through which medium they speak (Mudde, 2004). This correspondence between what these studies determine that Trump/radical rightists/populists communicate at rallies and what he/they communicate in general leaves ambiguous whether any of this meaning-making is particular to the rally itself. Trump and other populists alike may have chosen to make those meanings at rallies to take advantage of the rally's communicative affordances, or they may have done so simply because these are the meanings which they make and communicate across media.

A similar pattern runs through studies of communication at rallies in sub-Saharan Africa, where campaigning is particularly rally-intensive (Paget, 2019b) and rallies receive growing attention (Bob-Milliar and Paller, 2023; Kwayu, 2023; Lewanika, 2023; Lynch, 2023; Möller & Doeven-speck, 2023; Paget, Beardsworth and Lynch, 2023; Waddilove, 2023; Wilkins & Vokes, 2023). Studies of such communications find that politicians at rallies make clientelist (Gadjanova, 2017, p. 612; Kramon, 2017), programmatic (often, valence) (Brierley & Kramon, 2020; Horowitz, 2022) and ethnic or cross-ethnic appeals (Gadjanova, 2021; Opalo et al., 2021). However, studies of wider political mobilisation in Africa conclude that politicians make precisely the same clientelist (Kramon, 2017), programmatic (Cheeseman et al., 2014; Bleck & van de Walle, 2018) or ethnic appeals (Gadjanova, 2021) across a variety of media. Altogether, these studies treat what politicians say at rallies, at least implicitly, as the same as what they communicate via other means. In fact, many studies of rallies analyse what politicians say at rallies with the explicit intention of thereby determining what they say in general (Fujiwara & Wantchekon, 2013; Kramon, 2017; Gadjanova, 2017; Horowitz, 2022).

A small body of studies *does* attend to what is particular to meaning-making at rallies, albeit not explicitly in those terms. They show that the following are constructed or communicated at rallies, often through performance: spectacle (Chadwick, 2017; Karakaya & Edgell, 2021); 'buzz' (Muñoz,

2019); excitement (Alexander, 2010; Chadwick, 2017); effervescence (emotion in which a collectivity is formed) (Alexander, 2010; Karakaya & Edgell, 2021); politician-speaker popularity (Gadjanova, 2017; Muñoz, 2019); and relations of patronage and hierarchy (Foucher, 2007; Fraser, 2017).

I develop an answer which moves beyond each of these observations. I do so methodologically by focusing on what politicians (and audience members) literally *say* at those rallies through the spoken word. My answer is not only *applicable* to spoken communication at rallies; it is equally applicable to meanings encoded in embodied performances, interactions, images, signs, and indeed a variety of other such vessels at rallies. However, I develop it by studying speech at rallies. I do so because many of the meanings encoded in rally speech are explicit and particularly unambiguous. This makes them a particularly clear body of evidence to analyse meaning-making. I also do so because politician-speakers and audience members alike transform the meanings encoded in embodied performances through speech at rallies. Therefore, even though speech is far from being the only form of meaning-making at rallies, it is a particularly important form. Studying speech at rallies entails studying in particular what ‘speakers’ and ‘audiences’ say to one another in dialogue. This involves in particular, although not exclusively, studying what politicians say as ‘speakers’. ‘Speakers’ are expected to speak at length at rallies, as their name suggests, and their voices are the sole amplified voices. Therefore, ‘speakers’ at rallies get to have, if not the last word, then often the clearest and loudest words.

I argue that what politicians communicate at rallies as ‘speakers’ may *not* be the same as what they say via other media. To theorise why that might be so, I draw on genre theory, and in particular, Bakhtinian or constructivist genre theory (Thomson, 1984; Chandler, 1997) as developed and applied in media studies (Schmidt, 1987; Mittell, 2001). A media genre, thus theorised, is not a category used only by the analyst; instead, it is a living and continuously reconstructed set of ideas about a type of media content, be it reality shows, chat shows, game shows or news programmes, for example. These genres specify arrangements of components which instantiations of this genre incorporate. For instance, the television news interview genre encompasses textual elements, such as lead-ins, questions and answers; camera angles such as long-side and under-side shots; graphical overlays such as lower-thirds and backdrops; and physical devices such as anchor-desks and microphones (Clayman & Heritage, 2002; Montgomery, 2007; Craig, 2016). Simultaneously, it offers an interpretive context in which what those components signify is at least partially fixed. For example, in the context of the news interview, those present are constructed as the (neutral) interviewer and interviewee. Their speech becomes interpretable as an interrogative interactions filled with narrations, micro-arguments, evasions, and interventions, among other things (Clayman & Heritage, 2002;

Montgomery, 2007; Craig, 2016). A growing body of research analyses how political communication takes place through and across a variety of such genres (Clayman & Heritage, 2002; Tolson, 2005; Montgomery, 2007; Richardson et al., 2012; Craig, 2016).

I theorise the rally as such a genre. Rallies, like instantiations of other genres, share culturally-specific patterned combination of many units. Sequentially, rallies involve entertainment; speaker arrivals; prayers; praise-singing; a series of speeches, usually beginning with the most junior and ending with the most senior; closing festivities; and speaker departures; all punctuated by music, dance or other entertainment. In each of these sequential units, 'speaker' speech, 'audience' speech, 'speaker' action, 'audience' action, lighting, music, vehicles, decorations, dancing, staging, and a variety of other such components are overlaid. Each of the components consists of the many sub-components in turn. Speeches, for instance, incorporate a pattern of textual elements such as introductions of 'speakers', calls and answers, prompts for the "audience" to clap (or clap-traps), expressions of thanks and second-person addresses to 'the audience'. This genre-fixed combination of units is a template which the many rally co- and counter-producers creatively follow in the production of rallies. It is also a context in which those that behold rallies and re-mediations of rallies interpret what they signify.

Media studies show that genres of media influence how media content is produced (Scannell, 1991; Tolson, 2005; Craig, 2016). Producers use them as a template on which they draw creatively to make media content. Audiences make sense of that media content in relation to that genre. Therefore, if the rally *is* a genre, politicians (and audience members) might change *what* they communicate, *when* they communicate through rallies. If that were the case, what politicians said at rallies would *not* be the same as what they said in general. Instead, the rally might have affinities with certain meanings or modes of meaning-making. Therefore, I ask afresh: what meanings do politicians make and communicate at rallies? To explore this question, I emulate the abductive approaches adopted by an earlier generation of ethnographic studies of mass events in authoritarian regimes (Haugerud, 1995; Jourde, 2005; Wedeen, 2015).

### **Rally speech and representative claim-making**

The answer which I develop from this abductive approach is about representation. Representation was historically understood as a process carried out through formal, democratic institutions, or as a mode of action 'in the interests of represented, in a manner responsive to them (Pitkin, 1967, p. 209). Saward problematises those understandings. He elucidates that any proposition that someone acts in the interests of a constituency necessarily



relies on a selective construction of what that constituency's interests are. There must, he argues, be other, equally valid, constructions of that constituency's interests, none of which, in turn, would exhaust all of the other possible ways in which they could be constructed. The same is true, he argues, of any proposition that a representative advocates for, speaks for, champions or embodies some constituency. Each inevitably involves a construction of the constituency's position, opinion, cause or corporal form which, in its selectiveness, equally *mischaracterises* it. Therefore, representation does not have the status of fact; it is always, innately, something claimed.

Such a claim, Saward argues, is a claim that one entity is representative of another. As such, it necessarily invites not only the characterisation of a constituency, but the characterisation of a representative, and indeed the construction of a link by which the features of the former become representative of the latter. As he puts it:

If I allege that you, a potential constituent of mine, possess key characteristic X, and if I can get you to accept this characterization, I can then present myself as a subject possessing capacity or attribute Y that enables me to represent you by virtue of a certain resonance between X and Y. (Saward, 2010: 47)

Whatever the form of this link or resonance, in Saward's conception, it is a resonance between the characteristics of two entities. Therefore, representative claim-making is a form of meaning-making in which two entities are constructed as resonant each with the other. Representative claims are not claims in the sense that they are necessarily explicit (many are implicit) or well-reasoned. They are claims in the sense that it is necessarily only one of many possible ways that someone or something could have been construed as representative of the (constructed) constituency.

A politician that speaks at a rally is in no way compelled by their circumstances to make representative claims. However, the rally's genre-defined interpretive frame facilitates the making of such particular claims. To make a representative claim, the claim-maker not only needs to characterise an entity, and thereby make it a constituency, they have to construct it *as* one entity. Not only might a constituency be characterised in many different ways; it might be seen as multiple entities, rather than one. In fact, the same goes for the representatives. Even when the representative is singular, they must be singled-out as a one-person entity. Therefore, prior to the characterisation of two entities in a representative claim is their construction as two entities.

Events produced as rallies construct two such bodies: one singular, one mass. Those that go to a rally arrive with a plurality of identities. They might be constructed as any number of actors. However, the rally provides a context which fixes the categories into which people are folded. Those attend the rally become, for its duration, "speakers" and "audience". They

adopt these role-identities for its duration, and are seen and treated, not least by each other, as parts of these entities. As these entities exist as constructions, I continue to refer to them, as I have done so far, in quotation marks. Of course, multiple actors stand outside these categories, nonetheless masters of ceremonies, entertainers, journalists, and technicians. Yet in events produced as rallies, these actors' roles are fixed as peripheral, or even ancillary, to the interaction between 'speaker' and 'audience', which, as I argue elsewhere, defines the event (Paget, 2019b, p. 451). Thereby, events produced in the rally genre pre-construct two entities onto which representative claims can be grafted. Of course, this does not necessitate the making of representative claims. A rally can open and close without a representative claim being made. Nevertheless, the rally facilitates the making of such claims. It pre-cuts meaning-making paths which representative claim-makers can follow. So while representative claims can of course be made via any medium, the pre-construction of 'speaker' and 'audience' is the basis of an affinity between representative claim-making and the rally. Accordingly, as I illustrate below, politicians make representative claims prominently and frequently at rallies.

However, my argument is not only that politicians make representative claims at rallies. I also argue that they use their speech to draw audience members into the co-declaration of representative claims. First, they use their speech to invite rally audience members to vocally accept the representative claims made about them. This is precisely the dynamic of representative claim-making and acceptance which Saward envisages. Second, and more significantly, they make representative claims in dialogue with audience members. This is not reducible to the making and accepting of claims. Instead, it involves both 'speakers' and audience members part-uttering the claim itself; they each become claim-makers, in Saward's terminology. In such joint claim-making, 'the speaker' characterises themselves, and 'the audience' characterises itself. Neither need explicitly characterise themselves as representative or constituency. Yet each offers a characterisation which is resonant with the other. This concordance suggests that one is representative of the other. In other words, a subject-object link is implied, even if not made explicit. In such dialogue, neither actor's speech contains a representative claim. Yet, together, they contain all of the component parts thereof. Thereby, they co-produce (implicit) representative claims.

The nature of this co-production is significant. It is not only that two or more actors are involved in the articulation of the claims. It is that in co-producing the claims, each actor's claims were self-presentations. A representative claim produced through such self-presentations remains one of many potential equally valid claims. Nevertheless, it is based on characterisations of each actor which those actors themselves adopt. This alone may not truly legitimate the claim. Their self-presentations may be made under

duress, on false information, or with the intention to mislead, for example. Nevertheless, it puts behind these claims the weight of the *prima facie* authority of these actors to define themselves. Therefore, representative claims composed of such sets of self-presentation pairs are not only co-produced, but co-declared.

As Martin Montgomery elucidates through his analysis of Trump rallies (Montgomery, 2020), an integral part of the rally genre is the continuous interaction between ‘speaker’ and ‘audience’. I argue that this interactive format facilitates the co-production of representative claims through acceptance and co-declaration alike. These ‘speaker’-‘audience’ interactions are asymmetric. This asymmetry is rooted in each actor’s communicative affordances. ‘The speaker’ is usually amplified; ‘the audience’ is not. ‘The speaker’ has a singular voice. ‘The audience’ has a collective one. ‘The speaker’ communicates in prose; ‘the audience’ can only communicate coherently insofar as it speaks in cheers, applause and mono-syllables. Consequently, in events produced as rallies, ‘speakers’ talk at length, punctuated by frequent, short responses from ‘the audience’. ‘Speakers’ use these asymmetries of power to craft the dialogic context in which audience members speak. In doing so, they often script or guide what ‘audiences’ communicate back, not least by setting ‘clap-traps’ (Bull 2016). In interactions with such a rhythm, a ‘speaker’ can readily make a representative claim and then invite an ‘audience’ to accept it, or invite an ‘audience’ to present itself, before offering a concordant presentation of themselves. In short, the rally genre provides an interactive dynamic in which representative claims can be co-declared. I argue that at rallies, politicians frequently alter their speech to invite or otherwise induce the acceptance of representative claims by ‘audiences’, and co-produce such claims with their ‘audiences’.

In the following sections, I analyse the representative claim-making which goes on at rallies in Tanzania. In the next section, I show that ‘speakers’ at rallies make representative claims in Tanzania. In the following section, I show that ‘speakers’ and ‘audiences’ also co-produce such representative claims. In the final section, I show that ‘audiences’ retain agency in whether and how they co-produce representative claims with ‘speakers’.

## **Making representative claims**

This analysis took place during Tanzania’s 2015 election campaign. Tanzania is and has long been an electoral-authoritarian state, which has become more authoritarian since 2015 (Makulilo, 2012; Paget, 2021). The 2015 election campaign was a high water-mark of the viability of the leading opposition in Tanzania, Chadema. Its viability came after years of painstaking grass-roots organising (Babeiya, 2012; Paget, 2019a). It also came at the height of dissatisfaction with the ruling party, CCM (*Chama cha Mapinduzi* – Party of the

Revolution). In short, it took place in a period in which CCM's claims to represent Tanzanians were being contested and indeed reworked (Paget, 2023b, 2023c). The representative claim-making that I observed at rallies, especially those made by Chadema politicians, should be interpreted in this context.

As Tanzanian politicians spoke at rallies, they offered presentations of self (Goffman, 1959) as candidates do at other rallies (Muñoz, 2019). Not only did they do so across the transcripts of speeches of six rallies which I analysed. They did so near continuously within those speeches. Some of these self-presentations are part of overt introductions. Chadema incumbent MP and parliamentary candidate for Momba constituency, David Silinde, began every rally address by saying 'My name is David Ernest Silinde. The Voice of the Lion, the Lion of Momba'.<sup>2</sup> Explicit self-characterisations like this recur throughout politicians' speech at rallies. Amid one speech, Silinde said 'Here comes a lion; I speak, I criticise; I claim; I do everything'.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, politicians have others offer presentations on their behalves. George Gunda, the Chadema parliamentary candidate campaign manager in Iramba constituency, introduced his candidate as follows: 'This is my heroine, her name is Jessica David Kishoa, she is a brave woman with a tough heart. I have never seen a woman like her in this world'.<sup>4</sup>

However, most self-presentations by candidates were communicated implicitly through performance. Of course, many performances were non-vocal. Politicians presented themselves as united by joining hands and applauding each other's speeches, for example. They exhibited wealth by descending from helicopters and status by arriving at the head of long motorcades (Paget, 2023a). Then CCM presidential candidate John Pombe Magufuli projected energy and determination by doing press-ups on-stage, for example. Chadema presidential candidate Edward Lowassa crafted an image of highness and purity by matching his white hair with white clothes. However, many performances were vocal. Some acted-out personas indirectly in speech by declaring what they felt. Lowassa, for instance, repeatedly said, as he did at one rally in Mbeya city: 'why do I want the presidency? I'm tired of poverty'.<sup>5</sup> They tacitly presented themselves by articulating personal beliefs. Silinde told an "audience" that 'there is nothing as important in the world as education. You are being told education is the key of life. That's the truth'.<sup>6</sup> This extends to religious opinions. Silinde performed Christian piety by saying 'We as Chadema, and I Silinde, believe in one God and Jesus Christ'.<sup>7</sup>

Equally, politicians fashioned images of themselves for "audience" by speaking about policy, not least by talking about what they wish to do. CCM parliamentary candidate for Dodoma Town Mavunde told a rally 'audience' that 'I will supervise and champion for your rights so that you, the people of Ipagala, can benefit the most from the land'.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, Silinde told an "audience" that 'We want to educate your children for free'.<sup>9</sup> Of

course, these are explicit statements about intent and desire. Yet simultaneously, they are implicit statements about who they are, or the personas which they wish to present themselves as. Politicians, indeed, weave in connotations of their character into such policy talk. For instance, Mavunde's opponent, Chadema parliamentary candidate Benson Kigaila, used repetition and vow-making to convey his resolve about dissolving a much-hated local government body, the Capital Development Authority (CDA). He told "the audience" "We will officially break the CDA and return it to the Land Ministry ... do not be deceived. I will do this".<sup>10</sup> Incumbents embellish these policy personas with not only policy promises, but laudations of their policy achievements. Silinde, for example, told an "audience" that 'I got into Momba, all of our roads were bad, they were all impassable. But today we have improved almost all roads in Momba district'.<sup>11</sup>

While Tanzanian politicians dedicate their speech to characterising themselves, they dedicate attention to characterising "the audience" in front of them. At events produced as rallies, "speakers" address these "audience" directly; they speak to them in the second-person. This provides a ready opportunity for them to describe their circumstances. Gunda told an "audience" that 'you are the ones fetching water from far. You are the ones who are forced to deliver babies at home because you don't have health centres'.<sup>12</sup> They also use such speech to characterise an "audience's" needs. Gunda told the same "audience" directly 'you are in need of change, you need health centres with medicine, and you need water in this ward'.<sup>13</sup> Some politicians tacitly fold themselves into the body of "the audience" as they speak by adopting the first-person plural. Perhaps aware of the greater authority to speak for audience this self-inclusion connotes, they use such instances to describe what audiences feel and live. Silinde told an audience 'we have suffered greatly. We have suffered a great deal'.<sup>14</sup>

These characterisations of self and "audience" are as varied as political messages themselves. However, in every speech which I analyse, candidates frequently express them in combination to make representative claims. They make many such representative claims implicitly. They offer characterisations of themselves and "audiences" which are aligned. Take, for instance, what Silinde said to one rally "audience:"

If you choose Lowassa [as president], we said we shall lower prices of seeds, fertilisers and pesticides. Today, fertiliser in Tanzania is sold at higher price than anything else ... One bag of urea [fertiliser] in Tanzania sells for eighty thousand. How many have eighty thousand here? ... We've said no to that. We want our people not just to get fertilisers but get it at an affordable price.<sup>15</sup>

Silinde described a circumstance which, he alleged, kept his "audience" impoverished. He said that he and his presidential candidate would change that circumstance. Similarly, consider what Mavunde told his "audience:"

I know the second greatest issue in our area is the shortage of primary schools in our area. Our children walk long distances to seek knowledge. Today I have been shown the field where the construction of a primary school in Swaswa. My brothers, if you elect me as your MP and elect [ward councillor candidate] Gambo as well, our main job will be to complete the construction of that primary school.<sup>16</sup>

He specified what the 'greatest issue' in his and his 'audience's' shared area was. He offered a characterisation of his 'main job' which would directly resolve it. In each of these instances, the way in which the politicians characterised themselves and their 'audience' made the former readily interpretable as representative of the latter. This correspondence accentuated the juxtaposition of these characterisations. This is true in both of the extracts quoted above, but in other, pithier representative claims, it is even clearer. Consider what Gunda told an 'audience' at a Chadema rally: 'My fellows, Tanzanians need change, and that change is Lowassa'.<sup>17</sup>

Politicians also make representative claims explicitly. Before making the promises about land profiled above, Mavunde told his 'audience' that 'as your MP and also as a legislator with legal training, I will ensure I fight for your rights, especially you, the marginalised people, to ensure that you can own land where you live'.<sup>18</sup> In doing so, he not only offers pithy and concordant characterisations of himself and his 'audience', but specifies *how* he represents them: by fighting for their rights. Similarly, Lowassa, after declaring himself weary of poverty as I quoted above, told 'the audience' that 'I want to lead my nation from one meal to three meals ... My friends, send me [to State House] I'm well prepared to be your servant'.<sup>19</sup> After describing her 'audience's' poverty and her mission to expose corruption, Chadema parliamentary candidate for Iramba Jessica Kishoa told her 'audience' that 'we are doing this to defend the rights of the majority downtrodden residents of Iramba'.<sup>20</sup> In each of these cases, candidates added layers of significance to their implicit representative claims. They made explicit how they represented their 'audiences'. In the process, they articulated many different conceptions of representation. Some of those conceptions were idiosyncratic; some could have been lifted straight out of classic philosophical texts.

Politicians transformed the significance of their claims to represent their 'audiences' by ascribing identities to those 'audiences'. In other words, each politician-speaker not only asserted that they were representative of their 'audience' by characterising that 'audience'; they changed the constituency which the 'audience' embodied. They did so by choosing as whom they addressed 'the audience'. In the speeches I analysed, politicians, commonly, near universally, address 'audiences' as synonymous with the localities in which the rally is held. At parliamentary candidates' rallies, they often chose to address 'the audience' as the inhabitants of the ward or neighbourhood. For example, at his rally in Ipagala ward, Mavunde peppered his speech

with phrases such as ‘you, the people of Ipagala’.<sup>21</sup> Kigaila addressed a rally at a marketplace in Dodoma Town by saying ‘Dear commanders of Dodoma, my brothers and sisters’.<sup>22</sup> At presidential candidates’ rallies, politicians address ‘audiences’ as regions or cities. At Chadema’s rally for its presidential candidate in Mbeya, ‘speaker’ after ‘speaker’ addressed ‘the audience’ as Mbeya itself. Of course, it was *not* Mbeya itself. Nor does an ‘audience’ ever completely incorporate a locality. Therefore, politicians change the significance of the representative claims they make by thus addressing ‘audiences’. They transform their claims into claims that they represent not ‘audiences’, but entire localities.

While politicians almost always characterise their ‘audiences’ as localities, they often simultaneously characterise them as, or as embodiments of, other identities. I described that Mavunde addressed his ‘audience’ as ‘you, the marginalised people’.<sup>23</sup> Kishoa addressed hers as ‘the downtrodden’ (*wanyonge*),<sup>24</sup> a phrase President Magufuli was to popularise years later (Paget, 2023b). Kigaila interpellated himself and his ‘audience’ as ‘the losers’,<sup>25</sup> meaning ‘the wretched’. Implicitly, by claiming that they represented ‘the audiences’, they implied that they represented all such people.

Altogether, I have argued that at events produced as rallies, those in attendance take on the identities of ‘speakers’ and ‘audience’. This facilitates representative claim-making by providing two preconstructed entities – one singular, one mass – which such claim-making requires. I have illustrated, accordingly, that politicians at rallies in Tanzania do make such entities the subjects of their speech; that they do claim to represent ‘audiences’, both implicitly and explicitly; and that they transform the significance of these claims by portraying these ‘audiences’ as places and identities or embodiments thereof. In sum, I have shown that rallies in Tanzania are replete with such representative claim-making in a variety of forms.

### Co-declaring representative claims

Thus far, I have analysed how politicians articulate representative claims through *their* speech alone. In this section, I show that they also use their speech to orchestrate the co-declaration of representative claims in dialogue with ‘audiences’, and elicit ‘audience’ participation in this co-declaration. Some such declarations consist, more specifically, of what Saward theorises as acts of ‘acceptance’. In these acts, ‘audiences’ accept the component parts of representative claims made about them. Many of these acceptance acts are performative (Butler, 1988) and implicit, supplied through smiles, cheers, applause, dance or the omission of objection. However, others are made explicit through vocal assent or affirmation. Take, for instance this joking portrayal of Silinde by his ‘audience’ as impoverished:

Others here boast ‘you know sir, I haven’t drunk tea in five years’. It is not that you don’t like tea. You can’t afford sugar. Do you have two thousand five hundred? (Audience laughs) Am I lying? (Audience: NO!)<sup>26</sup>

The audience’s laughter might be read in context as a tacit acceptance of this portrayal. Yet in his follow-up question, and ‘the audience’s’ answer, they explicitly accept it. Similarly, Kigaila invited his marketplace ‘audience’ to confirm that their places of business were precarious.

Let me tell you, you’re doing business here in Sabasaba, aren’t you? ... You do business with no assurance of what will happen tomorrow. Is it not right? (Audience: TRUE!)<sup>27</sup>

In this example, ‘the audience’ does not voice their acceptance of the politician’s claims unprompted. On the contrary, the politician creates a moment in their speech for their ‘audience’ to do so. This is a variant on a clap-trap and (Atkinson, 1984; Bull, 2016). Often, as in this ‘audience’, they do so by explicitly asking ‘audiences’ to affirm or accept their claims. Other times, they leave pauses in their speech, signalled in advance through rhetoric devices, intonations and gestures, which in context invite ‘audience’ responses.

However, at the rallies which I analyse, ‘audiences’ contributed to representative claim-making not only by accepting them in Sawardian fashion, but by co-producing them. Of course, many of these acts of self-presentation were performed. For instance, a Chadema councillor candidate invited their ‘audience’ to self-identify as impoverished. ‘If last night you ate sardines just like you do every day, wave, and if in your pocket you don’t have five thousand or even two thousand, wave’ they said, as ‘the audience’ waved back at them. More widely, ‘audiences’ adopt personas by donning t-shirts, wraps, caps, face-paint and accessories in party colours and insignias. Equally, they convey their ideas by waving flags, by making Chadema’s two-finger ‘V’ or by making and holding aloft CCM’s closed fist.

However, as the rally transcripts show, they also offer them in speech. Once again, politicians craft the dialogic context in which ‘audiences’ thus characterise themselves. Thereby, they shape those characterisations. Consider this interaction between Silinde and his ‘audience’ at one rally.

Today those two hundred are the best life. If you look at whatever you think, whatever it is, we used to buy slippers for two hundred shillings, today how much? (Audience: THREE THOUSAND!) Yes, plastic crocs were sold for five hundred shillings, today how much? (Audience: FIVE THOUSAND!) Who is injured here? (Audience: CITIZENS!)<sup>28</sup>

This is certainly not reducible to a politician characterising an ‘audience’ and ‘the audience’ accepting that characterisation of themselves. They describe



for themselves the situation in which they live, and, indeed, they offer their opinion on who is hurt by this situation. Nevertheless, Silinde remains in control of the dialogue and what characterisation of ‘the audience’ emerges from it.

Politicians and “audience” co-produce implicit representative claims, like those analysed above, by each articulating aligned characterisations of themselves. Take, for instance, this further interaction between Silinde and his “audience” in the same rally.

Tin that sells at twelve thousand five hundred to sixteen thousand in other places, we’ve said, will be lowered to four thousand. Every citizen must afford modern housing [of which tin is a component] (Audience applauds and cheers) ... Do you want affordable tin? (Audience: YES!)<sup>29</sup>

In this example, like many of the instances of politician-articulated representative claims profiled above, politicians and “audience” offer characterisations of “audience” circumstances especially their material circumstances.

However, perhaps aware of the greater range of claims that “audience” co-production makes plausible, politicians guide “audience” to characterise themselves not only in reference to incontrovertible subjects such as what market prices are, but matters of “audience” opinion, judgement and desire. This enables the co-production of claims that politicians represent “audience” not only by acting in their interests, but by sharing and articulating those opinions. Consider this interaction between Kigaila and his “audience”.

What have you learned from them [CCM]? (Audience: SUFFERING!) *And I am the one to tell them, CCM, face-to-face, isn't it?* [emphasis added] Where is CCM heading? (Audience: Forward!) And what are you going to get? (Audience: SUFFERING!)<sup>30</sup>

In this dialogue, Kigaila not only elicits an “audience” condemnation of CCM. He presents himself as the vessel through which their condemnation will be presented to CCM. He presents himself, in other words, as the representative of “the audience”, in that he articulates their opinions.

## Contesting representative claims

The preceding sections illustrate the power that ‘the speaker’ enjoys at a rally to not only make representative claims but also guide and script the co-production of those claims by “the audience”. Nevertheless, the rally is not an event which is within the (complete) control of ‘the speaker’ or their co-producers. In spite of their limited communicative opportunities, “the audience” contests or contradicts representative claims (and indeed other claims) made by “the speaker”. Sometimes, these moments of

dissent are open and direct. I witnessed one at an impromptu Chadema rally for Lowassa held in 2015. It was held after a turbulent three weeks for Chadema, in which it had chosen Lowassa as its presidential candidate over its own secretary-general (Dr.) Wilboard Slaa, who resigned in protest. Lowassa told those assembled that 'I promise to work hard for you; we are going to win in this election' (Citizen, 2015). As Lowassa addressed the small crowd, one young man called out 'Dakta [Doctor] Slaa! Dakta Slaa!' in an intonation which suggested either a demand or a lament.<sup>31</sup> He continued to do so through Lowassa's short address. Thereby, that audience member made clear that Lowassa certainly did not represent him. Similarly, audience members can contradict representative claims in boos and jeers. In all my ethnographic research I never witnessed widespread audience booing, but I did witness CCM partisans assemble in a neighbourhood in Mwanza to jeer and hurl invectives at a Chadema convoy as it departed from a rally.

Other representative claims are interrogated when audience members are invited to ask questions of speakers, which are incorporated into some small rallies after 'the speaker's' principal address. At one of the Silinde rallies referred to above, for instance, when those in the audience were invited to speak, they asked about the whereabouts of funds, for which Silinde was apparently responsible, which had been promised for the construction of a medical dispensary.<sup>32</sup> Silinde was able to offer an account which deflected blame to a subordinate. Nevertheless, in questions like this, the representative claims which Silinde had made through the course of the rally, which as analysed above presented him as someone who delivers, were probed, if not undermined.

Some such challenges of speaker's representative claims by audience members take the forthright forms which I have just outlined. However, in the experience of my ethnographic research of rally production in Tanzania, most such challenges are not. Instead, members of the public choose to undermine or even contradict the 'speaker's' representative claims through what they do not do. At the softer end of this subversion, audience members participate in the co-production of representative claims, but with little enthusiasm. When audience members coproduced representative claims in these ways, they conveyed a reluctance, half-heartedness or reservation which undermined the claims themselves. I observed such lacklustre audience participation at several rallies. It was most common at small rallies where the producers lacked the local activists and/or the accompaniment of equipment and capital to foster atmospheres of festivity which were conducive to 'audience' enthusiasm (Paget, 2023a). At the harder end of this subversion is non-participation. One way to do so is to attend a rally but deliberately and ostentatiously not participate in dialogue with the speaker. Such non-participation does not undermine the

representative claim made at rallies per se. However, it does undermine a move frequently made by representative claims made at and about rallies: the transformation of who or what is constituted in 'the audience'. The frequent claim that 'the audience' is an embodiment of a locality or similar is undermined if the audience appears to be attended by few people from that locality.

## Conclusion

A major development in the study of politics in recent years has stemmed from the reconceptualization of representation as something claimed and contested. Representative claims can ultimately be made on any medium of communication. However, what I have elucidated in this article is that representative claim-making shares an affinity with the rally. This argument raises new questions for studies of representative claim-making. In particular, it raises questions about *how* and *where* they are made. Future research should investigate how frequently representative claims are made at other rallies. It should compare this to how frequently they are made on other media. Indeed, it should investigate how frequently they are made on other media through re-mediations of rallies. It should entertain the possibility that while representative claims are made across media, they are made especially intensively through rallies and re-mediations of rallies.

This argument also has implications for who chooses to convene rallies and how they choose to produce them. It may not only be that the rally facilitates the making of representative claims, but that people, on some level, are aware of this affordance and the practices it yields. Analyses of what people do at and with rallies should proceed with this possibility in mind. Politicians may choose to convene rallies so that they can make representative claims at them. This might be why populists and radical right politicians choose to convene and mediate so many rallies, aside from the direct and unfettered communication it enables them to establish with supporters, for example (Weyland, 2017, p. 50). Party assemblages may choose to produce rallies in order to cultivate, augment, complement or play upon the representative claims their parties can make at them. Similarly, activists and opponents may choose how to act at rallies with the intent of disrupting, subverting, refuting, or satirising. The possibilities are endless, and the same goes for media content produced about rallies. Future research ought to explore all of these possibilities. It should analyse what is done at rallies *in anticipation of* representative claim-making.

Finally, this article makes a clarion call for future research to explore the contestation of representative claims in Africa. This study illustrates that who represents whom and in what way is an everyday part of political

sense-making and contestation in Tanzania (at rallies). Yet such representative claim-making lies at the periphery of research on politics in Africa, studied only indirectly and inadvertently under other frameworks. Future research should build on recent studies (for example, see Dodworth, 2022: Chapter 6; Paget, 2023b) and analyse what ideas of representation are articulated and contested in Africa.

## Notes

1. Those six rallies include two held for Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema)'s then-parliamentary candidate for Momba District, David Silinde on the 1st and 2nd of October 2015 in Myunga and Nakawale Villages in Momba District; a rally held for then-Chadema parliamentary candidate for Dodoma Town constituency, Benson Kigaila, at Sabasaba Ward on the 8th of October 2015; a rally held for then-Chama cha Mapinduzi candidate for Dodoma Town constituency, Anthony Mavunde, on the 12th of October in Ipagala Ward, Dodoma Town; a rally held for the then-Chadema parliamentary candidate for Iramba District, Jesca Kishoa, on the 19th of October 2015 in Kitukutu Village, Iramba District; and a rally held for then-Chadema presidential candidate Edward Lowassa in Mbeya Town on the 19th of October (Tununu, 2015).
2. Transcript of David Silinde rally. 2 October 2015 Nakawale Village, Momba District.
3. Transcript of David Silinde rally. 1 October 2015 Myunga Village, Momba District.
4. Transcript of Jesca Kishoa rally. 19 October 2015. Kitukutu Village, Iramba District.
5. Transcript of Edward Lowassa rally. 19 October 2015. Mbeya Town.
6. Transcript of Silinde rally, 2 October.
7. Transcript of Silinde rally, 2 October. For the record, Chadema takes no official position on religion.
8. Transcript of Anthony Mavunde rally. 12 October 2015. Ipagala Ward, Dodoma Town District.
9. Transcript of Silinde rally, 2 October.
10. Transcript of Benson Kigaila rally. 8 October 2015 Sabasaba Ward, Dodoma Town District.
11. Transcript of Silinde rally, 1 October.
12. Transcript of Kishoa rally.
13. Transcript of Kishoa rally.
14. Transcript of Silinde rally, 1 October.
15. Transcript of Silinde rally, 2 October.
16. Transcript of Mavunde rally.
17. Transcript of Kishoa rally.
18. Transcript of Mavunde rally.
19. Transcript of Lowassa rally.
20. Transcript of Kishoa rally.
21. Transcript of Mavunde rally.
22. Transcript of Kigaila rally.
23. Transcript of Mavunde rally.
24. Transcript of Kishoa rally.

25. Transcript of Kigaila rally.
26. Transcript of Silinde rally, 2 October.
27. Transcript of Kigaila rally.
28. Transcript of Silinde rally, 2 October.
29. Transcript of Silinde rally, 1 October.
30. Transcript of Kigaila rally.
31. Field notes of rally for Edward Lowassa after he collected the form from the National Electoral Commission to file his nomination as Chadema's presidential candidate. 10 August 2015. Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam.
32. Transcript of Silinde rally, 2 October.

## Acknowledgements

Thanks to the anonymous reviewers, journal editor Andrew Wyatt, and Gabrielle Lynch for their comments on earlier drafts, which improved the paper considerably. Thanks to my research assistants, who wish to remain anonymous. Thanks to everyone in Tanzania who made this research possible through their hospitality, assistance, participation, insight and/or kindness.

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

## ORCID

Dan Paget  <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3883-1649>

## References

- Alexander, J. C. (2010). *The performance of politics: Obama's victory and the democratic struggle for power*. Oxford University Press.
- Atkinson, M. (1984). *Our masters' voices: The language and body language of politics*. Hove: Psychology Press.
- Babeiya, E. (2012). Multiparty elections and party support in Tanzania. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 47(1), 83–100. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909611418309>
- Bleck, J., & van de Walle, N. (2018). *Electoral politics in Africa since 1990: Continuity in change*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bob-Milliar, G., & Paller, J. (2023). The social embeddedness of elections. Ghana's 2016 and 2020 campaigns. *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, this issue.
- Brierley, S., & Kramon, E. (2020). Party campaign strategies in Ghana: Rallies, canvassing and handouts. *African Affairs*, 119(477), 587–603. <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adaa024>
- Bull, P. (2016). Claps and claptrap: The analysis of speaker-audience interaction in political speeches. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, 4(1), 473–492. <https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v4i1.436>
- Butler, J. (1988). Performative acts and gender constitution: An essay in phenomenology and feminist theory. *Theatre Journal*, 40(4), 519–531. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3207893>

- Chadwick, A. (2017). *The hybrid media system: Politics and power*. Oxford University Press.
- Chandler, D. (1997). *An introduction to genre theory*. [http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/intgenre/chandler\\_genre\\_theory.pdf](http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/intgenre/chandler_genre_theory.pdf).
- Cheeseman, N., Luna, J. P., Kitschelt, H., Paget, D., Sample, K., Toro, S., Mollada, J. V., van der Staak, S., & Wang, Y. (2014). *Politics meets policies: The emergence of programmatic political parties*. International IDEA.
- Citizen. (2015). *Dar grinds to a halt as Lowassa collects forms*. <https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/dar-grinds-to-a-halt-as-lowassa-collects-forms-2529668>.
- Clayman, S., & Heritage, J. (2002). *The news interview: Journalists and public figures on the air*. Cambridge University Press.
- Craig, G. (2016). *Performing politics: Media interviews, debates and press conferences*. John Wiley & Sons.
- de la Torre, C. (2022). The complex constructions of the people and the leader in populism. *Polity*, 54, 529–537. <https://doi.org/10.1086/719920>
- Disch, L. (2019). *Constructivist turn in political representation*. Edinburgh University Press.
- Disch, L. (2021). *Making constituencies: Representation as mobilization in mass democracy*. University of Chicago Press.
- Dodworth, K. (2022). *Legitimation as political practice: Crafting everyday authority in Tanzania*. Cambridge University Press.
- Foucher, V. (2007). Blue marches: Public performance and political turnover in Senegal. In J. Straus, & D. O'Brien (Eds.), *Staging politics: Power and performance in Asia and Africa* (pp. 111–130). Bloomsbury.
- Fraser, A. (2017). Post-populism in Zambia: Michael Sata's rise, demise and legacy. *International Political Science Review*, 38(4), 456–472. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512117720809>
- Fujiwara, T., & Wantchekon, L. (2013). Can informed public deliberation overcome clientelism? Experimental evidence from Benin. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 5(4), 241–255. <http://doi.org/10.1257/app.5.4.241>.
- Gadjanova, E. (2017). Electoral clientelism as status affirmation in Africa: Evidence from Ghana. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 55(4), 593–621. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X17000416>
- Gadjanova, E. (2021). Status-quo or grievance coalitions: The logic of cross-ethnic campaign appeals in Africa's highly diverse states. *Comparative Political Studies*, 54(3-4), 652–685. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020957683>
- Goffman, E. (1959). *The presentation of self in everyday life*. Harmondsworth.
- Haugerud, A. (1995). *Politics of culture in modern Kenya*. Cambridge University Press.
- Horowitz, J. (2022). *Multiethnic democracy: The logic of elections and policymaking in Kenya*. Oxford University Press.
- Jourde, C. (2005). "The president is coming to visit!": Dramas and the hijack of democratization in the Islamic republic of Mauritania. *Comparative Politics*, 37(4), 421–440. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20072902>
- Karakaya, Y., & Edgell, P. (2021). From politics as vocation to politics as business: Populist social performance and narrative fusion in Trump rallies. *Social Forces*, 101(2), 890–912. <https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soab150>
- Kramon, E. (2017). *Money for votes: The causes and consequences of electoral clientelism in Africa*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kwayu, A. (2023). Walking rallies: Chadema's way of reconnecting while campaigning in 2020 elections in Tanzania.

- Lacatus, C. (2020). Populism and president yump's approach to foreign policy: An analysis of tweets and rally speeches. *Politics*, 41(1), 31047. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395720935380>
- Lewanika, M. (2023). ZANU-PF (ab)use of bigwig rallies and performative politics in Zimbabwe's 2008 and 2013 election.
- Lynch, G. (2023). A rally-centric campaign: Hybridisation and the case of Kenya's 2022 elections.
- Makulilo, A. (2012). Uneveled playfield and democracy in Tanzania. *Journal of Politics and Law*, 5(2), 96–106. <https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v5n2p96>
- Mittell, J. (2001). A cultural approach to television genre theory. *Cinema Journal*, 40(3), 3–24. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1350192>.
- Montanaro, L. (2017). *Who elected Oxfam?: A democratic defense of self-appointed representatives*. Cambridge University Press.
- Montgomery, M. (2007). *The discourse of broadcast news: A linguistic approach*. Routledge.
- Montgomery, M. (2020). Populism in performance? *Journal of Language and Politics*, 19(5), 733–765. <https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.20019.mon>
- Möller, C., & Doevenspeck, M. (2023). The fast and the victorious: Mobility, motorcyclists and political mobilisation in Uganda. *Area*, advanced access. <https://doi.org/10.1111/area.12872>
- Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition*, 39(4), 541–563. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x>
- Mudde, C. (2019). *The far right today*. Polity.
- Mudde, C. (2021). Populism in Europe: An illiberal democratic response to undemocratic liberalism (The *government and opposition*/Leonard Schapiro lecture 2019). *Government and Opposition*, 56(4), 577–597. <https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2021.15>
- Muñoz, P. (2019). *Buying audiences*. Cambridge University Press.
- Opalo, K. O., Arriola, L., Choi, D., & Gichohi, M. (2021). Do voters respond to cross-ethnic campaigning in divided societies?
- Paget, D. (2019a). The authoritarian origins of well-organized opposition parties: The rise of Chadema in Tanzania. *African Affairs*, 118(476), 692–711. <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ady061>
- Paget, D. (2019b). The rally-intensive campaign: A distinct form of electioneering in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 24(4), 444–464. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161219847952>
- Paget, D. (2021). Tanzania: The authoritarian landslide. *Journal of Democracy*, 32(2), 61–76. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2021.0019>
- Paget, D., Beardsworth, N., & Lynch, G. (2023). *Campaign rallies and political meaning-making*. *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, this issue.
- Paget, D. (2023a). Capitalized rallies: Why campaign costs are rising and rallies are hybridizing in Tanzania. *Party Politics*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688231190033>.
- Paget, D. (2023b). Reinterpreting authoritarian populisms: The elitist plebeian vision of state. *Political Studies*, advanced access, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217231154098>
- Paget, D. (2023c). A people power philosophy: Republican ideology in opposition in Tanzania. *Democratization*, 30(3), 398–418. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2022.2150759>
- Pitkin, H. F. (1967). *The concept of representation*. University of California Press.
- Richardson, K., Parry K., & Corner, J. (2012). *Political culture and media genre: Beyond the news*. New York: Springer.
- Saward, M. (2010). *The representative claim*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Scannell, P. (1991). *Broadcast talk*. Sage.
- Schmidt, S. J. (1987). Towards a constructivist theory of media genre. *Poetics*, 16(5), 371–395. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-422X\(87\)90028-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-422X(87)90028-3)
- Schneiker, A. (2019). Telling the story of the superhero and the anti-politician as president: Donald Trump's branding on Twitter. *Political Studies Review*, 17(3), 210–223. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929918807712>
- Schwartz-Shea, P., & Yanow, D. (2012). *Interpretive research design: Concepts and processes*. Routledge.
- Taggart, P. (2004). Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9(3), 269–288. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1356931042000263528>
- Thomson, C. (1984). Bakhtin's 'theory' of genre. *Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature*, 9(1), 4–4. <https://doi.org/10.4148/2334-4415.1150>
- Tolson, A. (2005). *Media talk*. Edinburgh University Press.
- Tununu. (2015). *Full: Mkutano wa CHADEMA ruanda-nzovwe mbeya* [video]. YouTube, 19 October. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P6hj7fNrWwc&t=5s>.
- Urbinati, N. (2006). *Representative democracy: Principles and genealogy*. University of Chicago Press.
- Urbinati, N. (2019). *Me the people: How populism transforms democracy*. Harvard University Press.
- Valcore, J., Rodgers, J., & Asquith, N. L. (2021). 'We will build a great wall': Domination, criminalization, and expatriation in Trump campaign and rally speeches. *International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy*, 10(1), 143–158.
- Waddilove, H. (2023). Campaign rallies as elite alliance-building in a devolved Kenya.
- Wedeen, L. (2015). *Ambiguities of domination: Politics, rhetoric, and symbols in contemporary Syria*. University of Chicago Press.
- Weyland, K. (2017). Populism: A political-strategic approach. In C. Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of populism* (pp. 48–72). Oxford University Press.
- Wilkins, S., & Vokes, R. (2023). Understanding Ugandan politics through presidential rallies: performance, ritual, and context.