Capitalizing rallies and parties in Tanzania: why campaign costs rise and parties adapt, independent of mediatization and clientelism

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Campaign costs have risen in Africa. Consequently, parties have developing closer relationships to private financiers. I ask: what has driven this cost inflation and party adaptation? Studies of Western parties attribute it to campaign modernization as mediatization. Studies of African parties do not recognize this campaign advancement. They attribute these it to another cause: spiraling clientelism. I argue that there is a third, hitherto overlooked driver of such inflation and adaptation: the capitalization of rally production. This amounts to another form of campaign modernization. I trace this process in Tanzania, but this theory has wider reach. Many African campaigns are rally-intensive and have fewer authoritarian retardants of party competition than Tanzania. This makes it likely that other countries' experiences resembled or surpassed Tanzania's in Africa and beyond. Altogether, I demonstrate that there is ongoing innovation at rallies, and I revive a lens of party adaptation to theorize how parties change.

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The trend is clear: election campaign costs in Africa have risen, and risen dramatically (Cost of Politics, 2021). Studies show that parties have met these costs by incorporating ever-more wealthy candidates and MPs into their ranks (Koter, 2017; Arriola *et al.*, 2021; Wahman and Bech Seeberg, 2022). While they do not theorize it as such, the implication of these studies is that parties have undergone organizational adaptation analogous to that which Western parties underwent from the 1960s onwards. In these cases, as the cost of campaigning increased, parties raised more funds from private financiers. In exchange, they ceded to a variety of their demands. This increasing responsiveness to financiers amounted to the adoption of a business-oriented model of party organization (Epstein, 1980).[1]

I ask: what has driven this inflation of campaign costs and accompanying party adaptation in Africa? Research on Western campaigns offers one chief answer: campaign modernization (Norris, 2000). This modernization in turn has been propelled by mediatization, which has provided parties with new sorts of capital-intensive methods to employ and professionals to hire. This capitalization and professionalization has created steady upward pressure on campaign costs (Epstein, 1980; Stromer-Galley, 2019).

Research on African campaigns offers a different answer. Studies suggest that mediatization has remained partial (Carbone, 2007; Tatchou, 2022) and taken the form of social media-tization, which tempers campaign cost-rises (Kwayu, 2021). Instead, they argue that campaign costs in Africa have been raised by an upward spiral of clientelism (Koter, 2017). In short, they suggest, there has been rising costs and party adaptation, but that they

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[1] For a review of party organizational change, see Katz and Mair (1995).

have largely occurred without advancement through campaign time; they not been (principally) driven by campaign modernization.

In this article, I argue that there is and has been a third and hitherto overlooked driver of campaign costs and party adaptation in Africa: rally capitalization. Recognizing this driver requires conceptual rethinking. The literature conceives of the rally as 'premodern' and therefore innately capital-light and technologically simple (Norris 2000: 137). However, I unpack how rallies are produced. I argue that while old methods are labor-intensive, new ones have been developed which are capital-intensive. In competitive party systems, these innovations in rally production initiate a process of rally capitalization. Parties incorporate vehicle-mounted public address systems (PAs), motorcades, mobile stages, and helicopters, among other things, into rally production at scale. These create new ways of notifying voters, mobilizing attendance, preparing rally sites, fostering festivity and lending status.

I encountered and theorized this process in Tanzania. Tanzania has the most rally-intensive campaigns in the world. This extremity gave the process prominence, which facilitated my examination thereof. I employ process tracing methods of analysis and exposition. I conclude that rally capitalization substantially increased campaign costs and drove together parties and financiers over a twenty-year period. Therefore, clientelism and mediatization did not propel inflation and adaptation alone. While these conclusions could be idiosyncratic to Tanzania, there are two reasons to infer that they are not. First, many African election campaigns are rally-intensive (Paget, 2019), and so rally capitalization in aggregate is costly. Second, Tanzania has an electoral-authoritarian regime which has retarded party competition. This ought to have dampened this process in Tanzania. The fact that rally

capitalization proceeded there regardless increases the probability that it proceeded with even greater intensity elsewhere.

Therefore, my research contradicts the notion that campaign cost-inflation and party adaptation have taken place in Africa *without* movement through campaign time. Indeed, I argue that, while it does not involve mediatization, rally capitalization nevertheless constitutes a form of campaign modernization. While this variant of campaign modernization may have been inconsequential in Western countries, it is certainly consequential in Tanzania, and beyond.

Altogether, I qualify the sometimes-teleological attribution of transformative potential to new media alone. I illustrate a consequence of rally-intensiveness; it affects how parties organize. Lastly, I revive a theoretical lens which gives expression to this change in party organization.

Campaign modernization and party adaptation

What has driven rising campaign costs and accompanying party adaptation in Africa? Studies of Western parties attribute these phenomena to one principal cause: campaign modernization (Epstein, 1980; Norris, 2000).[2] They attribute modernization in turn to mediatization (Norris, 2000; Plasser and Plasser, 2002), where mediatization is the increase in the proportion of political communications which are transmitted via media (Strömbäck, 2008). Campaigns passed through the 'television age' (Ansolabehere, Behr and Iyengar, 1993) and the 'Internet age' (Stromer-Galley, 2019) in turn, or as Norris calls it, the 'last stage of the modernization

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[2] For overview of other drivers thereof, see Ware (1985), Wattenberg (1998) and Katz and Mair (1995).

process' (Norris 2000: 147). This ever-evolving mediatization capitalized campaigning; it enabled the development and adoption of capital-intensive campaign methods via those media, most significantly, television and Internet advertisements (Ansolabehere, Behr and Iyengar, 1993; Stromer-Galley, 2019). In the widely adopted 'shopping model', parties choose which such methods to adopt in context, but they choose from the same list of options, which modernization ever-lengthens (Plasser and Plasser, 2002). Second it professionalized campaigning; it involved adopting new practices, roles and expertise (Gibson and Rommele, 2001; Kreiss, 2016). This rolling capitalization and professionalization increased campaign costs.

In contrast, studies of African parties attribute little or none of the rising costs of campaigning or party adaptation to campaign modernization. These non-attributions turn on their analyses of mediatization. Older studies determine mediatization to be partial; communication was dominated by 'pavement radio' (Ellis, 1989). In this context, they judged that campaigns were hybrids of old and new: parties selectively incorporated modern methods from the 'shopping list' into campaigns otherwise dominated by 'culture-specific traditional campaign styles' (Plasser and Plasser 2002: 348). Giovanni Carbone claims that there was little such modernization or adaptation at all (Carbone 2007: 8). Of course, subsequent research documents significant mediatization that has occurred. However, it stresses that it has taken the form of social media-tization which widens the domain of people that can communicate (Nyabola, 2018). Studies find that parties' principal responses have not been to capitalize and professionalize. Instead, they have relied on amateur utilization of social media by politicians and 'cyber battalions', which have created lesser cost rises than mass mediatization would have (Gadjanova *et al.*, 2019; Kwayu, 2021). In fact, some studies

show that despite this mediatization, parties remain focused on ground campaigning over mediated campaigning (Kwayu, 2021, Tatchou, 2022; Lockwood et al., 2022).

Instead, studies of parties in Africa chiefly attribute these changes to spiraling clientelism. They document how citizen demands create pressures on MPs for gifts (Lindberg, 2010). Simultaneously, candidates (and parties) compete against rivals by each offering larger gifts than the other. These twin processes create continual upward pressures on campaign costs (Koter, 2017). The aforementioned studies of campaign costs in Africa explicitly attribute the rising costs to such clientelist inflation (Koter, 2017; Arriola *et al.*, 2021; Wahman and Bech Seeberg, 2022). The implication of their arguments is that campaign cost-rises and party adaptation in Africa have occurred with at most limited progress through campaign time. Insofar as it has been driven by clientelism alone, it has involved no movement through the practices associated which the successive stages of campaign modernization (Norris, 2000; Gibson and Rommele, 2001; Plasser and Plasser, 2002).

I argue that in Africa, these changes *have* involved campaign modernization. However, this modernization has taken a different form, one which is independent of mediatization: rally capitalization. These claims contradict ideas embedded in the literature. As I have already illustrated, prior research associates campaign modernity with new technologies, capital-intensive methods, and most of all, mediated communication (Norris, 2000; Plasser and Plasser, 2002). Likewise, it associates campaign premodernity with old technologies, labor-intensive methods and face-to-face communication. Capitalized and modernized rallies are unthinkable within this framework. This is my point of departure. Those characterizations are unimaginative about how rallies are produced: what is done to

make rallies work. Rallies may share an ancient format of speaker addressing audience. Nevertheless, the practices and devices that parties use to produce rallies need not be ancient. On the contrary, they create new practices of rally production, and new ways of arranging people and devices in those practices. Insofar as these practices become fixed in form, they constitute new technologies of rally production in the terms of Bruno Latour (1990) and media studies (Gitelman, 2008). Insofar as these technologies incorporate expensive devices at scale, they are capital-intensive. Therefore, the rally is not necessarily, a labor-intensive, technologically premodern method which takes a fixed form on the 'shopping list'. Instead, it is a format into which new capital-intensive arrangements of people and devices can be and have been creatively integrated.

This capital-intensive rally production amounts to a form of campaign modernization. Of course, this defies the conception of campaign modernization as mediatization in the literature. Rally capitalization is orthogonal to mediatization. Yet it displays the other hallmarks of modernization: technological innovation and capitalization. I argue that mediatization should be de-centered from campaign modernization. Campaign modernization in the global south need not take the form which it has taken in the global north.

The campaign modernization as rally capitalization is particularly pertinent in Africa, because in much of Africa, election campaigns are unlike others; they are rally-intensive (Paget, 2019). The rally constitutes a large proportion of face-to-face communication, and campaign communication as a whole. Every day of the campaign, rallies are convened not only by party leaders seeking media coverage, but by hundreds and thousands of candidates running in parliamentary and municipal elections respectively. The average national rate of rally attendance across the thirty-one sub-Saharan countries surveyed in the Seventh Round

of the Afrobarometer was 41.2% (Afrobarometer, 2019a). In contrast, just 7.2% of people attended rallies in the 2016 American election (ANES, 2017).[3] The spread of reported rally attendance across the continent is illustrated in Figure One below. This makes rally capitalization an important potential driver of campaign expenditure. As rallies are convened at scale, rises in their costs increases overall costs at scale.

Figure One. National rates of rally attendance across sub-Saharan Africa (Afrobarometer, 2019a)

I advance a theory that causally links innovations in these capital-intensive methods to campaign cost inflation and parties' relations to their financiers. This causal process draws its theoretical integrity from the literatures about campaign technological diffusion, party

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[3] 95% confidence of intervals of 6.2% and 8.2%.

competition and organizational change adaptation (Epstein, 1980; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). It follows this sequence:

A. **Innovate/infer.** Some parties or candidates develop a capital-intensive method of rally production, which is more effective than other methods. They make inferences about its effectiveness.

B. **Develop ties.** To solicit funds, they accede to private financiers' demands more.

C. **Raise funds.** In exchange, their financiers donate more money to them.

D. **Increase campaign expenditure.** They spend that money on campaigning.

E. **Capitalize rallies.** They employ capital-intensive methods of rally production more.

F. **Gain electoral advantage.** These methods yield electoral advantages to them.

This electoral advantage puts other parties and candidates under pressure to respond by raising funds and adopting these methods. These parties or candidates become the new subjects of the process from B through F. Equally, after observing the electoral advantage which the method brings, other parties or candidates revise their inferences about its effectiveness, initiating a new process from A through to F. Through these connections, the causal sequence becomes a cycle, which continues until the marginal benefit of capitalizing rallies falls enough to converge upon its cost. Through this process, candidates individually, and parties in aggregate, capitalize their rallies and develop closer ties to private financiers. The greater the exchange of funds for satisfaction of demands, the closer the ties.[4] This process is laid out in Figure Two. This process treads a fine line between structure and

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[4] For a theorization of organizational adaptation, see Pfeffer and Salancik (2003).

agency. Candidates and parties adopt or eschew these capital-intensive methods of their own volition. However, in competitive systems, parties that do not adapt do worse until they learn better or are weaned out.[5]

This rally-capitalizing process is missing in prior accounts of campaign and party change. I recognize that both mediatization and clientelism may have both driven cost inflation and party adaptation in Africa. However, I argue that the above process of party capitalization has also driven it. Therefore, campaign and party change in Africa has not taken place *outside* of campaign time, but within it.

Figure 2: Process of rally and party capitalization

A. Innovate/Infer

B. Develop ties
C. Raise funds

D. Increase campaign expenditure
E. Capitalise rallies

F. Gain electoral advantage

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[5] For a review of organizational ecology, see Baum (1999).

Alternative explanations

To substantiate my argument, I argue that this process – hereafter, the rally capitalization theory – non-negligibly contributed to the growing closeness of parties and their financiers in Tanzania between 1995 and 2015. I focus on Tanzania's dominant party and leading opposition party - *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) and *Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo* (Chadema). To substantiate these claims, I employ process tracing: the diagnosis of a process in a case. This diagnosis involves the consideration of alternative processes that may instead have been at work in a case (Bennett and Checkel, 2015). There are three such plausible alternative theories in this case.

The first two such theories follow from the Western and Africanist literatures reviewed above. First, mediatization propelled campaign modernization which increased costs and drove party adaptation. Second, spiraling clientelism inflated campaign costs and drove party adaptation. Several studies argue that precisely this process took place in Tanzania (Babeiya, 2011; Cooksey and Kelsall, 2011; Andreoni, 2017).

The third is specific to Tanzania and propounded by both Hazel Gray and Michaela Collord (Gray, 2015; Collord, 2022). They argue that businesspeople used their wealth to bribe officials and buy votes in CCM internal elections. Thereby, they gained power within CCM. They used this to extract rents, but also to achieve institutional changes which consolidated their power. In this process, intra-party campaign finance features, but inter-party campaign finance does not. Therefore, this is an alternate process by which private financiers and parties could have grown closer.

I refer to these three alternative processes as the mediatization, clientelism, and party capture theories. I do not contend that the processes expressed in these theories were absent in Tanzania. Indeed, I believe that they were each present. Mediatization, rising clientelism and a self-propelling process of party capture each contributed to the rising campaign costs and the growing closeness of parties and financiers. I merely argue that they were not present to the exclusion of rally capitalization. I seek to discount the *strong* versions of these theories, that they explain all, or all but a negligible proportion of, the rising campaign costs and the growing closeness between political parties and their financiers. I refer exclusively to the *strong* versions of these theories – thus defined - below.

Process tracing

Process tracing involves inferring from the evidence the likelihood that each contending theorized process was at work in the case (Bennett and Checkel, 2015). I develop eight hypotheses as process tracing tests. These tests take the forms of hypothesized intermediary empirical claims which bear on the probability that one or more of the contending theorized processes was at work in the Tanzanian case. They serve as expositional tools which make clear the reasoning by which I move from evidence to theory. Unlike hypotheses-as-working-theories, these hypotheses-as-process-tracing-tests are particular; they specify proper names. Some of these hypotheses correspond to the steps in the causal process outlined above. Others concern the links between those steps. The first three are:

Hypothesis 1. CCM's and Chadema's rally production became more capital-intensive over time, in accordance with step E above.

Hypothesis 2. CCM's and Chadema's campaign expenditure rose over time, in accordance with step D.

Hypothesis 3. Rises in CCM's and Chadema's campaign expenditure were constituted by increased expenditure on capital-intensive methods of rally production, in accordance the link between steps D and E.

Together, this trio of hypotheses is disconfirmatory. If the evidence supported them, it would follow that rally capitalization constituted a substantial portion of any rises in campaign expenditure. In that case, it could not be that the rising costs of campaign mediatization or clientelism accounted for all, or almost all rises in campaign expenditure in Tanzania. Therefore, the *strong* versions of the mediatization and clientelism theories should be rejected

Hypotheses One to Three would not confirm the rally capitalization theory in its entirety. It would not confirm that the adoption of rally-intensive methods began with innovation and involved inferences about their effectiveness, in accordance with step A. Nor would it confirm that rally capitalization by some induced rally capitalization by others, in accordance with the link between Points F and B, which makes the sequence a cycle. Nor would it be sufficient grounds to reject the corollary of the strong version of the party capture theory, that rising campaign expenditure was a negligible driver of CCM's growing closeness to its financiers.

Innovation in and competition through rally capitalization are elusive subjects because they are diffuse; they occur across the production of hundreds of thousands of rallies over twenty years of campaigns. To render the process tangible, I follow the introduction of one particular capital-intensive method of election campaigning: the helicopter. The helicopter is so expensive that few are employed by politicians in Tanzania. This makes its proliferation

traceable. I examine it as a lens onto dynamics of innovation and competition across capital-intensive methods of rally production.

> Hypothesis 4. After the first time the helicopter was employed as a campaign tool, similarly well-resourced parties and candidates adopted it too.

If the evidence supported this hypothesis, it would document acts of inference and mimicry which follow innovation, in accordance with step A and the link between it and step B in Figure Two. This would further support the rally capitalization theory.

> Hypothesis 5. After the helicopter was adopted as a campaign tool across parties, each party incrementally increased the number of helicopters that it employed.

If the evidence supported this hypothesis, it would suggest that helicopter-use by some induced further helicopter-use by others, in accordance with the link between steps F and B. The final hypotheses connect rising campaign expenditure to party adaptation.

> Hypothesis 6. CCM and Chadema raised progressively more funds from private financiers over time, in accordance with point C.
>
> Hypothesis 7. CCM and Chadema acceded progressively more to private financiers over time, in accordance with point B.
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> Hypothesis 8. CCM and Chadema were motivated to raise funds from private financiers because they wished to increase campaign expenditure.

Evidence which supported Hypotheses Six and Seven would further support the rally capitalization theory but would not discount the strong version of the party capture theory; it

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would still be possible that CCM and Chadema's close ties to their financiers were driven completely, or almost completely, by exogenous dynamics of party capture. Hypothesis Eight is designed to disconfirm the strong version of this theory. If the explicit motivation for raising funds from private financiers was for the purpose of campaign expenditure, parties' ties to financiers could not be the product of party capture alone. Instead, no matter what else was driving parties to financiers, they were driven still closer to them by their (express) intent to raise further funds to capitalize their rallies more than their opponents.

In sum, evidence which supported Hypotheses One, Two, Three and Eight would be sufficient to reject the *strong* versions of the mediatization, clientelism, and party capture theories. Each Hypothesis One to Eight supported by the evidence further indicates that rally capitalization played out in Tanzania. In the absence of an alternative theory which explains each of these phenomena, those indications would be independent and cumulative. Together, they would be sufficient to confirm this inference.

I undertook an ethnography of ground campaigning in Tanzania, which encompassed the 2015 campaign. I undertook 148 unstructured interviews. I latently participated in and observed forty-two rallies. Through this exploratory research, I generated the theory of rally capitalization. See the appendix for more information. I designed subsequent theory-testing data collection to generate evidence which would confirm or disconfirm my hypotheses (Bennett and Checkel, 2015). I undertook further six unstructured interviews with select political actors and commentators. In 2017, I commissioned two research assistants to administer fourteen structured interviews with parliamentary and councilor candidates and their campaign managers from the 2015 campaign, selected for convenience, following a detailed script. I gathered data from election observation reports, confidential US embassy

cables on Wikileaks, and other grey literature. This subsequent research generated the mainstay of evidence about party expenditure, party funding and parties' relationships to financiers. I supplemented this with insights from my interviews. Tanzania is an increasingly authoritarian state. To protect my research assistants and vulnerable interviewees, I anonymize them.

Labor- and capital-intensive methods of rally production

Other studies describe a variety of labor-intensive activities undertaken to produce rallies (Paget, 2019). These activities contribute to five tasks. They engage callers and musicians to *notify* people about the rally (Anonymous M, 2015). They *prepare* the rally site by raising flags, building a stage and forming a starter-crowd of activists. They *foster festivity* by laying on entertainers. They *mobilize* attendance by going door-to-door. Lastly, they *lend status* to the candidates and parties by meeting them with welcome committees and accompanying them in processions.

Once, rallies were produced in Tanzania almost exclusively using these methods. However, new methods of rally production have been gradually adopted since then. Parties increasingly *notify* residents about forthcoming rallies using vehicle-mounted public address (PA) systems. If a parliamentary candidate used PAs in 1995, she probably used only one, to amplify her speeches (Mtei 2009: 205). By 2015, most candidates fielded several. While one was reserved for speakers, others were deployed 'to go around the community announcing that there will be a rally' (Anonymous L, 2015). Supplementing callers and musicians with vehicle-mounted PAs is an unambiguous case of rally capitalization.

Parties also used PAs to *prepare* rally sites. Typically, a vehicle-mounted PA was dispatched to play music and become a visible - indeed, an audible – congregation point (Fieldnotes, 2016g). They also transported mobile stages (Anonymous C, 2017; Anonymous D, 2017). The most modest were platforms, erected on-site (Fieldnotes, 2015g). The most elaborate were trucks converted to bear mechanized stages, PAs and generators (Fieldnotes, 2015f). These vehicles enabled parties to prepare several rallies in tandem and candidates to move between them rapidly. I witnessed both CCM and Chadema deploy vehicles and candidates in relay like this (Anonymous B, 2017; Anonymous N, 2015).

The PA was also used to *foster festivity*. The volume and bass of the stereo is a draw in Tanzania. At a rally I attended in Vwawa, the excitement was palpable; people rushed to dance to music between each speaker's address (Fieldnotes, 2015e). Altogether, the vehicle-mounted PA system is an archetypal case of how rally production changed in Tanzania. It gradually supplemented and, in some cases, replaced labor-intensive methods of notifying residents, preparing sites, and fostering festivity.

PAs aside, vehicle-use increased between 1995 and 2015. Vehicles were used to *mobilize* people by transporting them to rallies. Originally, this technique was exclusive to national rallies, but it was gradually adopted at local ones; I witnessed trucks carrying people to parliamentary candidates' rallies in four constituencies (Fieldnotes, 2015d; 2015g; 2015h). A CCM district campaign manager said that they employed twenty vehicles in addition to buses to transport people (Anonymous D, 2015).

Equally, candidates travelled to rallies at the head of long convoys of vehicles. Their noise, size and color rendered them parades or travelling carnivals which *fostered festivity*. My field notes of one rally recorded that:

> *Five or six cars arrive with more boda boda [motorcycle taxis] all carrying Chadema flags…young men chase them around the grounds excitedly.* (Fieldnotes, 2015f)

Each vehicle in a motorcade lends the party and candidate further status. I watched CCM's presidential candidate arrive in Mwanza accompanied by perhaps a hundred cars and several hundred motor-bikes flying party flags. These capital-intensive methods replicated effects previously achieved using labor-intensive ones, at greater scale.

The most capital-intensive method used to produce rallies is the helicopter. Helicopters lend candidates both speed and mobility. The helicopter also *lends status* to the party or candidate. The helicopter is an emblem of modernity, a symbol of humankind's triumph over their natural limitations through flight. Chadema Central Committee member Mwesiga Baregu remarked that the helicopter 'suggests power and importance' (Baregu, 2015). Equally, it invokes metaphors about social status and elevation; politicians in helicopters literally descend to the village. Another Chadema Central Committee member, Tundu Lissu, explained that 'For a lot of people, airplanes are things you see up in the sky' (Lissu, 2015b).

Helicopter landings are also spectacles. This extraordinary dimension of the helicopter *fosters festivity* and *mobilizes* voters to attend rallies. One Chadema parliamentary candidate remarked that 'The chopper attracts masses, people come to rallies to see it' (Anonymous N, 2015). A newspaper report of a Chadema rally in 2005 read 'The helicopter

hovering within the Usa-River caused major stir in the township as thousands of people left their regular tasks and rushed towards the open air venue' (Arusha Times, 2005). I witnessed a similar event first-hand in Iramba (Fieldnotes, 2015g).

Pilots seemed to understand and play to the spectacular aspect of the helicopter. I observed this when Chadema's presidential candidate arrived at a rally by helicopter. The pilot flew the helicopter in a long ellipse around the rally site, making several passes. The pilot may have been deciding where to land the helicopter, but her orbital path was unnecessarily wide. It took the helicopter far past the grounds and over the body of the nearby town. This impromptu air show lasted eight minutes (Fieldnotes, 2015b). The pilot was *notifying* the town that Chadema's presidential candidate had arrived. These tactics are commonplace in Tanzania. One campaign veteran said that typically 'the chopper would hover around the city, town and village, and that way draw people to go the rally' (Baregu, 2015).

In this regard, the helicopter can fulfil most tasks of rally production. Therefore, it can be used as a supplement to or a substitute for other labor- or capital-intensive methods. The helicopter's potential as a wholesale substitute, in combination with mobile truck stages, was illustrated in the 2005 elections, when Chadema's presidential candidate, Freeman Mbowe, flew to rallies by helicopter. Lissu said that the helicopter:

> *... We didn't have party structures on the ground. Without a chopper, we wouldn't have been able to organize rallies. ... [because they flew by helicopter] we were able to get a huge number, to compensate for the lack of ground troops (Lissu, 2015b).*

In sum, parties conventionally employed labor-intensive methods to undertake five tasks of rally production. Over time, they adopted capital-intensive methods to supplement or replace them. This is summarized in Table One. This constitutes substantial support for Hypothesis One.

Table One: Labor- and capital-intensive methods of producing rallies

Tasks to produce rallies	Labor-intensive methods	Capital-intensive methods	
		First generation	Second-gen.: helicopter
Notify voter	Call, play music, mount fliers or posters	Dispatch vehicle-mounted PA systems	Fly-by
Mobilize attendance	Convince voters to attend face-to-face	Transport people to rally via buses and trucks	Arrival
Prepare rally sites	Gather party members; erect flags, bunting and a stage	Dispatch vehicles with mounted PA system; dispatch a mobile-stage truck	NA
Foster festivity	Provide singing, dancing, poetry or entertainment	Hire professional performers; hire celebrities; arrive with motorcade	Fly-by
Lend status	Form a welcome group, arrive ahead a parade	Arrive with motorcade	Arrival

Rising election campaign expenditure

In this section, I demonstrate that between 1995 and 2015, campaign expenditure rose across parties, which supports Hypothesis Two. Then I demonstrate that these rises in expenditure were made-up of higher spending on rally capitalization, which supports Hypothesis Three.

There are few publicly available sources that aggregate Tanzanian parties' campaign spending. However, numerous qualitative accounts form a picture of low campaign expenditure in 1995 (Lissu, 2015a; Jussa, 2017; Mtei, 2009: 207-8). These conditions were

especially commonplace across the opposition from 1995 to 2005 (Shayo, 2005). However, both CCM's and Chadema's campaign expenditure rose, especially between 2005 and 2015. Domestic election observers judged that in 2010:

> *...the campaign materials for the bigger parties, especially the ruling CCM, are clearly more elaborate and expensive in this than in previous elections... some parties and candidates have spent fortunes. (TEMCO, 2011:8)*

Describing the 2015 election, domestic observers wrote that parties made 'the huge investments during campaigns' (LHRC and TACCEO, 2016: 38). Tanzanian politicians give similar first-hand accounts of recent changes in campaign expenditure. For example, one CCM ward account attested that at 'the last election [2010] the spending increased' (Anonymous K, 2017). Altogether, this amounts to significant evidence in support of Hypothesis Two.

Five anonymous parliamentary candidates and campaign managers gave estimates of the total costs of their 2015 campaigns. They cluster at $46,000 (Anonymous B, C, D, E, 2017; Anonymous N, 2015).[6] This closely corresponds to campaign costs estimated in representative candidate surveys elsewhere in Africa (Cost of Politics, 2021). These figures are high. As a point of reference, GDP per capita in Tanzania stood at $836 in 2015.[7] These estimates, while vulnerable to unrepresentativeness, provide a conservative benchmark

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[6] These five estimates were: 1) between $16,100 and $23,100; 2) $27,700 and $36,900; 3) $46,000 or more; and 4) between $46,000 and $69,156; and 5) between $46,000 and $92,200. given in Tanzanian Shillings but converted into United States Dollars using the mid-market rate of 25th October 2015, and then rounded to the nearest hundred.

[7] For commensurability, non-PPP measure used.

against which to estimate the proportion of campaign expenditure dedicated to capital-intensive methods of rallies in 2015. Interviewees gave the daily price of car-hire at between $23 and $69 (Anonymous F, G and H, 2017), consistent with quotes I received (Anonymous O, 2015). For all sixty-three days of the official campaign, one car at these prices would consume between 3.2% and 9.5% of a $46,000 budget. The equivalent prices they gave for PA van-hire put full campaign-use at between 6.3% and 15.8% of a $46,000 budget. These estimates exclude fuel. As parliamentary candidates hire small squadrons of vehicles, the cost of hiring and fueling them alone would near-fill campaign budgets.

Finally, helicopters dwarf other campaign expenditures. A quote from a Tanzanian aviation company put the hourly-price of helicopter-hire at $3,250, exclusive of landing and pilot fees (Anonymous I, 2015). A Tanzanian politician estimated $2,000 per hour (Anonymous L, 2017). Even at this lower price, one four-hour day would consume 17% of the typical $46,000 budget. Six such days would exceed it. In the 2015 campaign, CCM and Chadema employed at least ten helicopters between them. Assuming conservatively that they were employed for four-hour days for half the campaign, total expenditure on helicopter-hire alone would have been over $2.5 million. Therefore, we can deduce that exorbitant amounts were spent capitalizing rallies in 2015.

As campaign expenditure rose significantly between 1995 and 2015, and a majority of 2015 spending was on capital-intensive rally production, it is *likely* that a large portion of those rises in total expenditure were driven by rally capitalization. In conjunction with the scale by which rally capitalization increased over time, it is a logical necessity.

Interviewees attest to this directly. A Chadema parliamentary candidate's campaign manager told me that 'in campaigns you must use cars, and PA systems, all of those are hired, and they are expensive' (Anonymous J, 2017). Similarly, when a CCM parliamentary candidate's campaign manager was asked what the most expensive campaign parts of the campaign were, he replied 'The public announcement and music truck' (Anonymous K, 2017). Another opposition party leader Ismail Jussa told me that 'most of the funds that we have used go into the rallies in the campaign' (Jussa, 2017).

In sum, there is sufficient evidence to support Hypotheses Two and Three. Therefore, by the reasoning laid out above, the strong versions of the mediatization and clientelism theories should be rejected. The evidence presented above shows that rally capitalization did not constitute a negligible portion of rising campaign expenditure; it constituted a significant portion of it. Therefore, it can be inferred that rally capitalization yields an electoral advantage; Chadema would not have capitalized its rallies over twenty years at great cost if it did not.

Patterns in helicopter proliferation

In this section, I present evidence which addresses the role of innovation and competition in rally and party capitalization, in accordance with Hypotheses Four and Five.

In congress with the literature on campaign technology (Gibson and Rommele, 2001), innovation began where it was most urgent: in the opposition. Opposition Chadema MP Philemon Ndesamburo became the first parliamentary candidate to campaign by helicopter, in 2000. In 2005, Chadema Chairman Mbowe became the first presidential candidate to campaign by helicopter. In 2010, President Jakaya Kikwete (CCM) campaigned by

helicopter. This behavior was congruent with imitation; it appears as though politicians mimicked one another as they made new inferences about the electoral advantage the helicopter supplied. Indeed, Chadema leader Baregu told me that Mbowe's helicopter-use 'put CCM completely on the wrong foot. Afterwards, they realized they could maybe draw on our example' (Baregu, 2015). This supports Hypothesis Four.

However, CCM went further than matching Chadema's helicopter use; it sought to exceed it. In 2010, CCM arranged for not one but three helicopters to transport its presidential candidate and other national leaders across the country (TEMCO, 2010: 54). Chadema used two helicopters in 2005 and 2010. However, in 2015 it hired four. Its leaders also frequently travelled between airfields by private plane. Perhaps anticipating Chadema's upscaling, CCM candidates hired at least six helicopters between them (Ubwani, 2015). This pattern of helicopter adoption is consistent with a process of competitive one-upmanship specified in Hypothesis Five. This is also suggested by interviewees. One Chadema official said that 'In 2015, the candidates were motivated to spend more and reach a big number of people' (Anonymous B, 2015).

Parties' funding and ties to financiers

In this section, I show that between 1995 and 2015, both CCM and Chadema raised progressively more funds from private financiers, in accordance with Hypothesis Six. I also show that they acceded gradually more to their financiers' demands, in accordance with Hypothesis Seven. Financiers' demands can take numerous forms. I concentrate on the official positions, the economic rents and the influence within the party which they gained. Finally, I present evidence that they were motivated to raise funds from private financiers to increase campaign expenditure, in accordance with Hypothesis Eight. Parties jealously guard

the secrecy of their finances, their financiers, and their internal politics. Consequently, the evidence which I synthesize below offers only a fragmented and contestable picture. Nonetheless, these hypotheses stand *a fortiori*. Other studies have generated substantial evidence in support of each of them, which I summarize.

CCM

CCM holds considerable financial assets (Mmuyu and Chaligha, 1994; Morse, 2014) and it receives revenues from state subventions to parties which are allocated proportionate to vote-share. Nonetheless, studies determine that it progressively raised campaign finance from business (Babeiya 2011: 95). Studies conclude that between 1995 and 2004 CCM reached out to intermediate classes of businesspeople' (Andreoni 2017: 25). This trend intensified from 2005 to 2010, when the ascension of faction *Mtandao*. Multimillionaires became party funders (Shubash Patel and Tanil Somaiyi) and finance committee members (Salim Turky and Abdulaziz Abood) (Aminzade, 2014: 346; Africa Intelligence, 2009). Soon-to-be billionaire Rostam Aziz (Nsehe, 2013) became the 'key CCM fundraiser' (Africa Intelligence, 2009; Africa Confidential, 2010). As *Mtandao* split and some funders were temporarily excluded (i.e. Aziz), others took their place (i.e. Reginald Mengi) (Cooksey and Kelsall 2011: 37). This all supports Hypothesis Six.

CCM incorporated financiers by making them its candidates and office-holders. Four multimillionaires and soon-to-be billionaires –Turky, Abood, Aziz and Mohamed Dewji – became CCM MPs. Abood and Dewji sat on its National Executive Committee. Aziz sat on its Central Committee. This all supports Hypothesis Seven.

More widely, CCM's financiers received illicit economic rents. The strongest evidence is from successive official inquiries and prosecutions which produced public records of such rents. Reviewing them, Gray judges that they 'exposed a much wider set of links between the ruling party and businesses' (Gray 2015: 391). Studies agree that such rent-seeking increased in frequency and scale during Kikwete's presidencies (Gray, 2015; Andreoni, 2017), consistent with Hypothesis Seven. Financiers gained influence within CCM too. Collord argues that financiers gained increasing power in CCM (Collord, 2022). For instance, the judgement of one classified US diplomatic cable, never intended for public circulation, and therefore - perhaps - more candid, was that 'Rostam Aziz wields extraordinary influence in CCM' (Wikileaks, 2017). This all supports Hypothesis Seven.

It remains possible that CCM and business grew closer because of party capture to the exclusion of rally capitalization. However, other evidence shows that CCM also raised money with the *intention* of meeting campaign expenditure. The studies referenced above claim that businesspeople donated to, or that CCM solicited funds *for the campaign*. For instance, Cooksey and Kelsall argue that CCM colluded with business 'to secure funds for ruling party election campaigns' (Cooksey and Kelsall 2011: 85), for what they assume is clientelism. Interviewees attest to this too. One CCM official said that 'Most of the time, politicians are close to businesspeople… the costs [of campaigning] are huge' (Anonymous K, 2017). A CCM parliamentary campaign manager made the intent behind actions explicit:

> *we used business people, through business associations fundraising… there is a formulated system for business people fundraising to the candidate. (Anonymous F, 2017)*

This spells-out that CCM politicians did not only spend superfluous funds on campaigns, if they did at all; they asked businesspeople for (further) donations to meet campaign expenses. Indeed, they constructed a 'system' for this purpose. Pressures to raise funds drove them (still) closer to financiers. All this evidence – primary and secondary - indicates that the relationship between rally capitalization and CCM's growing closeness to financiers was at least in part causal. It was not the product of an exogenous process of party capture alone. This supports Hypothesis Eight, and the rally capitalization theory.

Chadema

Initially, Chadema depended on its businessmen-founders (Mmuyu and Chaligha, 1994: 190; Mtei, 2009: 140). As Chadema won seats, its subventions grew. Between 2011 and 2014, it received approximately $5 million 'from government [subventions] and other sources' (Slaa, 2014). However, party account-summaries show that these were consumed entirely by routine costs and out-of-campaign party-building (Slaa, 2014). Chadema's private funding and its financiers' influence grew in tandem from 2004, when Mbowe became chairman. Lissu described Mbowe as the 'financier in chief' (Lissu, 2015a). Chadema senior official Deogratias Munishi said that in 2015:

> *As for presidential candidate, much of the resources would come from our fundraising campaigns. We had, we hosted three dinner fundraisings in Dar-es-Salaam… We raised money*. (Munishi, 2017)

Therefore, Chadema's private funding rose, which supports Hypothesis Six. Unlike CCM, this funding was concentrated in its leadership.

The influence of Chadema's financiers, specifically its financier-leaders, increased over time. This concentration of influence proceeded even as the party grew in organizational size and structural complexity, both trends which militate against the power of the leader. Despite Mtei's financial network, his power ebbed and flowed in a struggle over indigenization policy (Africa Confidential, 1997). As Chadema's private financing increased, the power of its financier-leaders did too. Mtei's son-in-law Mbowe was elected chairman in 2004. By 2015, Chadema's leadership channeled funding to its parliamentary candidates in competitive races (Baregu, 2015; Munishi, 2017), creating relationships of dependence between them. Mbowe twice won a 'power struggle' (Kabwe, 2018) against party leaders Zitto Kabwe and Wilbroad Slaa. These events had many determinants, but they suggest that Mbowe consolidated his power more than Mtei, even as Chadema became more organizationally complex. Other studies corroborate this inference (Sulley, 2021; Babeiya, 2022). This supports Hypothesis Seven.

Fund-raising was explicitly to finance campaigns. For instance, a councilor candidate recounted that 'I talked to the businessmen of that particular area, asked for their support and some of them donated' (Anonymous G, 2015). One parliamentary campaign manager that 'most of our funders, were close friends, [for] example we approached them and they gave us a car, and also our community leaders, who contributed fuel' (Anonymous A, 2015). These donations in kind can only plausible have been for campaigning. This shows that Chadema candidates asked financiers for resources for the purpose of capitalizing rallies. This supports Hypothesis Eight. Therefore, the growing closeness of parties and financiers could not have been driven entirely, or almost entirely, by exogenous dynamics of party capture.

Conclusion

In Tanzania, from 1995 to 2015, campaign costs inflated and parties adapted. In all likelihood, this process was driven in part by clientelism and perhaps by mediatization, as previously studies suggest. However, I have demonstrated that it was also driven by a process of rally capitalization. Therefore, accounts of campaign cost inflation and party adaptation in Africa should be revised. It could be that Tanzania's rally capitalization is an outlier. However, as many campaigns in Africa are rally-intensive, they provide enabling environments for this process. Moreover, this competition-driven process gathered pace in Tanzania in spite of the competition-blunting authoritarianism of a dominant party. The implication is that in more competitive campaigns, rally capitalization will have proceeded further. For instance, in Kenya, politicians registered 86 helicopters for its 2017 campaign (Duggan, 2017) - rally capitalization *par excellence*.

This study contains a warning for those that take reductive views of campaign evolution (Norris, 2000; Plasser and Plasser, 2002). Campaign modernization can take place not through the mediatization of campaigning, but through technological innovation in the production of face-to-face communications, and one in particular: the rally.

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